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Abstract
Bayesian statistics is based on the subjective definition of proba-
bility as “degree of belief” and on Bayes’ theorem, the basic tool for
assigning probabilities to hypotheses combining a priori judgements
and experimental information. This was the original point of view
of Bayes, Bernoulli, Gauss, Laplace, etc. and contrasts with later
“conventional” (pseudo-)definitions of probabilities, which implicitly
presuppose the concept of probability. These notes show that the
Bayesian approach is the natural one for data analysis in the most
general sense, and for assigning uncertainties to the results of physical
measurements - while at the same time resolving philosophical aspects
∗[
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of the problems. The approach, although little known and usually mis-
understood among the High Energy Physics community, has become
the standard way of reasoning in several fields of research and has
recently been adopted by the international metrology organizations in
their recommendations for assessing measurement uncertainty.
These notes describe a general model for treating uncertainties
originating from random and systematic errors in a consistent way and
include examples of applications of the model in High Energy Physics,
e.g. “confidence intervals” in different contexts, upper/lower limits,
treatment of “systematic errors”, hypothesis tests and unfolding.
2
Contents
3
“The only relevant thing is uncertainty - the extent of our
knowledge and ignorance. The actual fact of whether or not
the events considered are in some sense determined, or
known by other people, and so on, is of no consequence”.
(Bruno de Finetti)
1 Introduction
The purpose of a measurement is to determine the value of a physical quan-
tity. One often speaks of the true value, an idealized concept achieved by
an infinitely precise and accurate measurement, i.e. immune from errors. In
practice the result of a measurement is expressed in terms of the best esti-
mate of the true value and of a related uncertainty. Traditionally the various
contributions to the overall uncertainty are classified in terms of “statisti-
cal” and “systematic” uncertainties, expressions which reflect the sources of
the experimental errors (the quote marks indicate that a different way of
classifying uncertainties will be adopted in this paper).
“Statistical” uncertainties arise from variations in the results of repeated
observations under (apparently) identical conditions. They vanish if the num-
ber of observations becomes very large (“the uncertainty is dominated by
systematics”, is the typical expression used in this case) and can be treated -
in most of cases, but with some exceptions of great relevance in High Energy
Physics - using conventional statistics based on the frequency-based defini-
tion of probability.
On the other hand, it is not possible to treat “systematic” uncertainties
coherently in the frequentistic framework. Several ad hoc prescriptions for
how to combine “statistical” and “systematic” uncertainties can be found in
text books and in the literature: “add them linearly”; “add them linearly if
. . . , else add them quadratically”; “don’t add them at all”, and so on (see,
e.g., part 3 of [1]). The “fashion” at the moment is to add them quadrat-
ically if they are considered independent, or to build a covariance matrix
of “statistical” and “systematic” uncertainties to treat general cases. These
procedures are not justified by conventional statistical theory, but they are
accepted because of the pragmatic good sense of physicists. For example,
an experimentalist may be reluctant to add twenty or more contributions
linearly to evaluated the uncertainty of a complicated measurement, or de-
cides to treat the correlated “systematic” uncertainties “statistically”, in
both cases unaware of, or simply not caring about, about violating frequen-
tistic principles.
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The only way to deal with these and related problems in a consistent way
is to abandon the frequentistic interpretation of probability introduced at
the beginning of this century, and to recover the intuitive concept of proba-
bility as degree of belief. Stated differently, one needs to associate the idea of
probability to the lack of knowledge, rather than to the outcome of repeated
experiments. This has been recognized also by the International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO) which assumes the subjective definition of
probability in its “Guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement”[2].
These notes are organized as follow:
• sections 1-5 give a general introduction to subjective probability;
• sections 6-7 summarize some concepts and formulae concerning random
variables, needed for many applications;
• section 8 introduces the problem of measurement uncertainty and deals
with the terminology.
• sections 9-10 present the analysis model;
• sections 11-13 show several physical applications of the model;
• section 14 deals with the approximate methods needed when the gen-
eral solution becomes complicated; in this context the ISO recommen-
dations will be presented and discussed;
• section 15 deals with uncertainty propagation. It is particularly short
because, in this scheme, there is no difference between the treatment
of “systematic” uncertainties and indirect measurements; the section
simply refers the results of sections 11-14;
• section 16 is dedicated to a detailed discussion about the covariance
matrix of correlated data and the trouble it may cause;
• section 17 was added as an example of a more complicate inference
(multidimensional unfolding) than those treated in sections 11-15.
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2 Probability
2.1 What is probability?
The standard answers to this question are
1. “the ratio of the number of favorable cases to the number of all cases”;
2. “the ratio of the times the event occurs in a test series to the total
number of trials in the series”.
It is very easy to show that neither of these statements can define the concept
of probability:
• Definition (1) lacks the clause “if all the cases are equally probable”.
This has been done here intentionally, because people often forget it.
The fact that the definition of probability makes use of the term “prob-
ability” is clearly embarrassing. Often in text books the clause is re-
placed by “if all the cases are equally possible”, ignoring that in this
context “possible” is just a synonym of “probable”. There is no way
out. This statement does not define probability but gives, at most, a
useful rule for evaluating it - assuming we know what probability is, i.e.
of what we are talking about. The fact that this definition is labelled
“classical” or “Laplace” simply shows that some authors are not aware
of what the “classicals” (Bayes, Gauss, Laplace, Bernoulli, etc) thought
about this matter. We shall call this “definition” combinatorial.
• definition (2) is also incomplete, since it lacks the condition that the
number of trials must be very large (“it goes to infinity”). But this is a
minor point. The crucial point is that the statement merely defines the
relative frequency with which an event (a “phenomenon”) occurred in
the past. To use frequency as a measurement of probability we have to
assume that the phenomenon occurred in the past, and will occur in the
future, with the same probability. But who can tell if this hypothesis
is correct? Nobody: we have to guess in every single case. Notice that,
while in the first “definition” the assumption of equal probability was
explicitly stated, the analogous clause is often missing from the second
one. We shall call this “definition” frequentistic.
We have to conclude that if we want to make use of these statements to
assign a numerical value to probability, in those cases in which we judge that
the clauses are satisfied, we need a better definition of probability.
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Figure 1: Certain and uncertain events.
2.2 Subjective definition of probability
So, “what is probability?” Consulting a good dictionary helps. Webster’s
states, for example, that “probability is the quality, state, or degree of be-
ing probable”, and then that probable means “supported by evidence strong
enough to make it likely though not certain to be true”. The concept of
probable arises in reasoning when the concept of certain is not applicable.
When it is impossible to state firmly if an event (we use this word as a syn-
onym for any possible statement, or proposition, relative to past, present or
future) is true or false, we just say that this is possible, probable. Different
events may have different levels of probability, depending whether we think
that they are more likely to be true or false (see Fig. 1). The concept of
probability is then simply
a measure of the degree of belief that an event will1 occur.
This is the kind of definition that one finds in Bayesian books[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
and the formulation cited here is that given in the ISO “Guide to Expression
of Uncertainty in Measurement”[2], of which we will talk later.
At first sight this definition does not seem to be superior to the combi-
natorial or the frequentistic ones. At least they give some practical rules to
calculate “something”. Defining probability as “degree of belief” seems too
1The use of the future tense does not imply that this definition can only be applied for
future events. “Will occur” simply means that the statement “will be proven to be true”,
even if it refers to the past. Think for example of “the probability that it was raining in
Rome on the day of the battle of Waterloo”.
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vague to be of any utility. We need, then, some explanation of its meaning;
a tool to evaluate it - and we will look at this tool (Bayes’ theorem) later.
We will end this section with some explanatory remarks on the definition,
but first let us discuss the advantages of this definition:
• it is natural, very general and it can be applied to any thinkable event,
independently of the feasibility of making an inventory of all (equally)
possible and favorable cases, or of repeating the experiment under con-
ditions of equal probability;
• it avoids the linguistic schizophrenia of having to distinguish “scientific”
probability from “non scientific” probability used in everyday reasoning
(though a meteorologist might feel offended to hear that evaluating the
probability of rain tomorrow is “not scientific”);
• as far as measurements are concerned, it allows us to talk about the
probability of the true value of a physical quantity. In the frequentistic
frame it is only possible to talk about the probability of the outcome of
an experiment, as the true value is considered to be a constant. This ap-
proach is so unnatural that most physicists speak of “95% probability
that the mass of the Top quark is between . . . ”, although they believe
that the correct definition of probability is the limit of the frequency;
• it is possible to make a very general theory of uncertainty which can
take into account any source of statistical and systematic error, inde-
pendently of their distribution.
To get a better understanding of the subjective definition of probability
let us take a look at odds in betting. The higher the degree of belief that
an event will occur, the higher the amount of money A that someone (“a
rational better”) is ready to pay in order to receive a sum of money B if the
event occurs. Clearly the bet must be acceptable (“coherent” is the correct
adjective), i.e. the amount of money A must be smaller or equal to B and
not negative (who would accept such a bet?). The cases of A = 0 and A = B
mean that the events are considered to be false or true, respectively, and
obviously it is not worth betting on certainties. They are just limit cases,
and in fact they can be treated with standard logic. It seems reasonable2
that the amount of money A that one is willing to pay grows linearly with
2This is not always true in real life. There are also other practical problems related
to betting which have been treated in the literature. Other variations of the definition
have also been proposed, like the one based on the penalization rule. A discussion of the
problem goes beyond the purpose of these notes.
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the degree of belief. It follows that if someone thinks that the probability
of the event E is p, then he will bet A = pB to get B if the event occurs,
and to lose pB if it does not. It is easy to demonstrate that the condition of
“coherence” implies that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
What has gambling to do with physics? The definition of probability
through betting odds has to be considered operational, although there is
no need to make a bet (with whom?) each time one presents a result. It
has the important role of forcing one to make an honest assessment of the
value of probability that one believes. One could replace money with other
forms of gratification or penalization, like the increase or the loss of scientific
reputation. Moreover, the fact that this operational procedure is not to be
taken literally should not be surprising. Many physical quantities are defined
in a similar way. Think, for example, of the text book definition of the electric
field, and try to use it to measure ~E in the proximity of an electron. A nice
example comes from the definition of a poisonous chemical compound: it
would be lethal if ingested. Clearly it is preferable to keep this operational
definition at a hypothetical level, even though it is the best definition of the
concept.
2.3 Rules of probability
The subjective definition of probability, together with the condition of co-
herence, requires that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. This is one of the rules which probability
has to obey. It is possible, in fact, to demonstrate that coherence yields to
the standard rules of probability, generally known as axioms. At this point
it is worth clarifying the relationship between the axiomatic approach and
the others:
• combinatorial and frequentistic “definitions” give useful rules for eval-
uating probability, although they do not, as it is often claimed, define
the concept;
• in the axiomatic approach one refrains from defining what the probabil-
ity is and how to evaluate it: probability is just any real number which
satisfies the axioms. It is easy to demonstrate that the probabilities
evaluated using the combinatorial and the frequentistic prescriptions
do in fact satisfy the axioms;
• the subjective approach to probability, together with the coherence
requirement, defines what probability is and provides the rules which
its evaluation must obey; these rules turn out to be the same as the
axioms.
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Figure 2: Venn diagrams and set properties.
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Events sets
symbol
event set E
certain event sample space Ω
impossible event empty set ∅
implication inclusion E1 ⊆ E2
(subset)
opposite event complementary set E (E ∪ E = Ω)
(complementary)
logical product (“AND”) intersection E1 ∩E2
logical sum (“OR”) union E1 ∪E2
incompatible events disjoint sets E1 ∩ E2 = ∅
complete class finite partition
{
Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ (i 6= j)
∪iEi = Ω
Table 1: Events versus sets.
Since everybody is familiar with the axioms and with the analogy events⇔
sets (see Tab. 1 and Fig. 2) let us remind ourselves of the rules of probability
in this form:
Axiom 1 0 ≤ P (E) ≤ 1;
Axiom 2 P (Ω) = 1 (a certain event has probability 1);
Axiom 3 P (E1 ∪ E2) = P (E1) + P (E2), if E1 ∩ E2 = ∅
From the basic rules the following properties can be derived:
1: P (E) = 1− P (E);
2: P (∅) = 0;
3: if A ⊆ B then P (A) ≤ P (B);
4: P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∩ B) .
We also anticipate here a fifth property which will be discussed in section 3.1:
5: P (A ∩ B) = P (A|B) · P (B) = P (A) · P (B|A) .
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2.4 Subjective probability and “objective”description
of the physical world
The subjective definition of probability seems to contradict the aim of physi-
cists to describe the laws of Physics in the most objective way (whatever
this means . . . ). This is one of the reasons why many regard the subjec-
tive definition of probability with suspicion (but probably the main reason is
because we have been taught at University that “probability is frequency”).
The main philosophical difference between this concept of probability and an
objective definition that “we would have liked” (but which does not exist in
reality) is the fact that P (E) is not an intrinsic characteristic of the event
E, but depends on the status of information available to whoever evaluates
P (E). The ideal concept of “objective” probability is recovered when every-
body has the “same” status of information. But even in this case it would
be better to speak of intersubjective probability. The best way to convince
ourselves about this aspect of probability is to try to ask practical questions
and to evaluate the probability in specific cases, instead of seeking refuge in
abstract questions. I find, in fact, that, paraphrasing a famous statement
about Time, “Probability is objective as long as I am not asked to evaluate
it”. Some examples:
Example 1: “What is the probability that a molecule of nitrogen at atmo-
spheric pressure and room temperature has a velocity between 400 and
500 m/s?”. The answer appears easy: “take the Maxwell distribution
formula from a text book, calculate an integral and get a number. Now
let us change the question: “I give you a vessel containing nitrogen and
a detector capable of measuring the speed of a single molecule and you
set up the apparatus. Now, what is the probability that the first molecule
that hits the detector has a velocity between 400 and 500 m/s?”. Any-
body who has minimal experience (direct or indirect) of experiments
would hesitate before answering. He would study the problem carefully
and perform preliminary measurements and checks. Finally he would
probably give not just a single number, but a range of possible num-
bers compatible with the formulation of the problem. Then he starts
the experiment and eventually, after 10 measurements, he may form a
different opinion about the outcome of the eleventh measurement.
Example 2: “What is the probability that the gravitational constant GN
has a value between 6.6709 · 10−11 and 6.6743 · 10−11 m3kg−1s−2?”.
Last year you could have looked at the latest issue of the Particle
Data Book[8] and answered that the probability was 95%. Since then
- as you probably know - three new measurements of GN have been
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Institut GN
(
10−11 m
3
kg·s2
)
σ(GN )
GN
(ppm)
GN−GCN
GC
N
(10−3)
CODATA 1986 (“GCN”) 6.6726± 0.0009 128 –
PTB (Germany) 1994 6.7154± 0.0006 83 +6.41± 0.16
MSL (New Zealand) 1994 6.6656± 0.0006 95 −1.05± 0.16
Uni-Wuppertal 6.6685± 0.0007 105 −0.61± 0.17
(Germany) 1995
Table 2: Measurement of GN (see text).
performed[9] and we now have four numbers which do not agree with
each other (see Tab. 2). The probability of the true value of GN being
in that range is currently dramatically decreased.
Example 3: “What is the probability that the mass of the Top quark, or
that of any of the supersymmetric particles, is below 20 or 50GeV/c2?”.
Currently it looks as if it must be zero. Ten years ago many experiments
were intensively looking for these particles in those energy ranges. Be-
cause so many people where searching for them, with enormous human
and capital investment, it means that, at that time, the probability was
considered rather high, . . . high enough for fake signals to be reported
as strong evidence for them3.
The above examples show how the evaluation of probability is conditioned
by some a priori (“theoretical”) prejudices and by some facts (“experimental
data”). “Absolute” probability makes no sense. Even the classical example
of probability 1/2 for each of the results in tossing a coin is only acceptable if:
the coin is regular; it does not remain vertical (not impossible when playing
on the beach); it does not fall into a manhole; etc.
The subjective point of view is expressed in a provocative way by de
Finetti’s[5]
“PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST”.
3We will talk later about the influence of a priori beliefs on the outcome of an experi-
mental investigation.
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3 Conditional probability and Bayes’ theo-
rem
3.1 Dependence of the probability from the status of
information
If the status of information changes, the evaluation of the probability also has
to be modified. For example most people would agree that the probability
of a car being stolen depends on the model, age and parking site. To take
an example from physics, the probability that in a HERA detector a charged
particle of 1GeV gives a certain number of ADC counts due to the energy
loss in a gas detector can be evaluated in a very general way - using High
Energy Physics jargon - making a (huge) Monte Carlo simulation which takes
into account all possible reactions (weighted with their cross sections), all
possible backgrounds, changing all physical and detector parameters within
reasonable ranges, and also taking into account the trigger efficiency. The
probability changes if one knows that the particle is a K+: instead of very
complicated Monte Carlo one can just run a single particle generator. But
then it changes further if one also knows the exact gas mixture, pressure,
. . . , up to the latest determination of the pedestal and the temperature of
the ADC module.
3.2 Conditional probability
Although everybody knows the formula of conditional probability, it is useful
to derive it here. The notation is P (E|H), to be read “probability of E given
H”, where H stands for hypothesis. This means: the probability that E will
occur if one already knows that H has occurred4.
4P (E|H) should not be confused with P (E ∩ H), “the probability that both events
occur”. For example P (E ∩ H) can be very small, but nevertheless P (E|H) very high:
think of the limit case
P (H) ≡ P (H ∩H) ≤ P (H |H) = 1 :
“H given H” is a certain event no matter how small P (H) is, even if P (H) = 0 (in the
sense of Section 6.2).
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The event E|H can have three values:
TRUE: if E is TRUE and H is TRUE;
FALSE: if E is FALSE and H is TRUE;
UNDETERMINED: if H is FALSE; in this case we are merely uninter-
ested as to what happens to E. In terms of betting, the bet is invali-
dated and none loses or gains.
Then P (E) can be written P (E|Ω), to state explicitly that it is the proba-
bility of E whatever happens to the rest of the world (Ω means all possible
events). We realize immediately that this condition is really too vague and
nobody would bet a cent on a such a statement. The reason for usually writ-
ing P (E) is that many conditions are implicitly - and reasonably - assumed
in most circumstances. In the classical problems of coins and dice, for exam-
ple, one assumes that they are regular. In the example of the energy loss, it
was implicit -“obvious”- that the High Voltage was on (at which voltage?)
and that HERA was running (under which condition?). But one has to take
care: many riddles are based on the fact that one tries to find a solution
which is valid under more strict conditions than those explicitly stated in
the question (e.g. many people make bad business deals signing contracts in
which what “was obvious” was not explicitly stated).
In order to derive the formula of conditional probability let us assume for
a moment that it is reasonable to talk about “absolute probability” P (E) =
P (E|Ω), and let us rewrite
P (E) ≡ P (E|Ω) =
a
P (E ∩ Ω)
=
b
P
(
E ∩ (H ∪H))
=
c
P
(
(E ∩H) ∪ (E ∩H))
=
d
P (E ∩H) + P (E ∩H) , (1)
where the result has been achieved through the following steps:
(a): E implies Ω (i.e. E ⊆ Ω) and hence E ∩ Ω = E;
(b): the complementary events H and H make a finite partition of Ω, i.e.
H ∪H = Ω;
(c): distributive property;
(d): axiom 3.
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The final result of (1) is very simple: P (E) is equal to the probability that E
occurs and H also occurs, plus the probability that E occurs but H does not
occur. To obtain P (E|H) we just get rid of the subset of E which does not
contain H (i.e. E ∩ H) and renormalize the probability dividing by P (H),
assumed to be different from zero. This guarantees that if E = H then
P (H|H) = 1. The expression of the conditional probability is finally
P (E|H) = P (E ∩H)
P (H)
(P (H) 6= 0) . (2)
In the most general (and realistic) case, where both E and H are conditioned
by the occurrence of a third event H◦, the formula becomes
P (E|H,H◦) = P (E ∩ (H|H◦))
P (H|H◦) (P (H|H◦) 6= 0) . (3)
Usually we shall make use of (2) (which means H◦ = Ω) assuming that Ω
has been properly chosen. We should also remember that (2) can be resolved
with respect to P (E ∩H), obtaining the well known
P (E ∩H) = P (E|H)P (H) , (4)
and by symmetry
P (E ∩H) = P (H|E)P (E) . (5)
Two events are called independent if
P (E ∩H) = P (E)P (H) . (6)
This is equivalent to saying that P (E|H) = P (E) and P (H|E) = P (H), i.e.
the knowledge that one event has occurred does not change the probability
of the other. If P (E|H) 6= P (E) then the events E and H are correlated. In
particular:
• if P (E|H) > P (E) then E and H are positively correlated;
• if P (E|H) < P (E) then E and H are negatively correlated;
3.3 Bayes’ theorem
Let us think of all the possible, mutually exclusive, hypotheses Hi which
could condition the event E. The problem here is the inverse of the previous
one: what is the probability of Hi under the hypothesis that E has occurred?
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For example, “what is the probability that a charged particle which went in
a certain direction and has lost between 100 and 120 keV in the detector, is a
µ, a π, a K, or a p?” Our event E is “energy loss between 100 and 120 keV”,
and Hi are the four “particle hypotheses”. This example sketches the basic
problem for any kind of measurement: having observed an effect, to assess
the probability of each of the causes which could have produced it. This
intellectual process is called inference, and it will be discussed after section 9.
In order to calculate P (Hi|E) let us rewrite the joint probability P (Hi ∩
E), making use of (4-5), in two different ways:
P (Hi|E)P (E) = P (E|Hi)P (Hi) , (7)
obtaining
P (Hi|E) = P (E|Hi)P (Hi)
P (E)
, (8)
or
P (Hi|E)
P (Hi)
=
P (E|Hi)
P (E)
. (9)
Since the hypotheses Hi are mutually exclusive (i.e. Hi ∩Hj = ∅, ∀ i, j) and
exhaustive (i.e.
⋃
iHi = Ω), E can be written as E∪Hi, the union of E with
each of the hypotheses Hi. It follows that
P (E) ≡ P (E ∩ Ω) = P
(
E ∩
⋃
i
Hi
)
= P
(⋃
i
(E ∩Hi)
)
=
∑
i
P (E ∩Hi)
=
∑
i
P (E|Hi)P (Hi) , (10)
where we have made use of (4) again in the last step. It is then possible to
rewrite (8) as
P (Hi|E) = P (E|Hi)P (Hi)∑
j P (E|Hj)P (Hj)
. (11)
This is the standard form by which Bayes’ theorem is known. (8) and (9) are
also different ways of writing it. As the denominator of (11) is nothing but
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a normalization factor (such that
∑
i P (Hi|E) = 1), the formula (11) can be
written as
P (Hi|E) ∝ P (E|Hi)P (Hi) . (12)
Factorizing P (Hi) in (11), and explicitly writing the fact that all the events
were already conditioned by H◦, we can rewrite the formula as
P (Hi|E,H◦) = αP (Hi|H◦) , (13)
with
α =
P (E|Hi, H◦)∑
i P (E|Hi, H◦)P (Hi|H◦)
. (14)
These five ways of rewriting the same formula simply reflect the importance
that we shall give to this simple theorem. They stress different aspects of
the same concept:
• (11) is the standard way of writing it (although some prefer (8));
• (9) indicates that P (Hi) is altered by the condition E with the same
ratio with which P (E) is altered by the condition Hi;
• (12) is the simplest and the most intuitive way to formulate the the-
orem: ”the probability of Hi given E is proportional to the initial
probability of Hi times the probability of E given Hi”;
• (13-14) show explicitly how the probability of a certain hypothesis is
updated when the status of information changes:
P (Hi|H◦) (also indicated as P◦(Hi)) is the initial, or a priori, proba-
bility (or simply “prior”) of Hi, i.e. the probability of this hypoth-
esis with the status of information available before the knowledge
that E has occurred;
P (Hi|E,H◦) (or simply P (Hi|E)) is the final, or “a posteriori”, prob-
ability of Hi after the new information;
P (E|Hi, H◦) (or simply P (E|Hi)) is called likelihood.
To better understand the terms “initial”, “final” and “likelihood”, let us
formulate the problem in a way closer to the physicist’s mentality, referring
to causes and effects: the causes can be all the physical sources which may
produce a certain observable (the effect). The likelihoods are - as the word
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says - the likelihoods that the effect follows from each of the causes. Using
our example of the dE/dx measurement again, the causes are all the possi-
ble charged particles which can pass through the detector; the effect is the
amount of observed ionization; the likelihoods are the probabilities that each
of the particles give that amount of ionization. Notice that in this example
we have fixed all the other sources of influence: physics process, HERA run-
ning conditions, gas mixture, High Voltage, track direction, etc.. This is our
H◦. The problem immediately gets rather complicated (all real cases, apart
from tossing coins and dice, are complicated!). The real inference would be
of the kind
P (Hi|E,H◦) ∝ P (E|Hi, H◦)P (Hi|H◦)P (H◦), . (15)
For each status of H◦ (the set of all the possible values of the influence
parameters) one gets a different result for the final probability5. So, instead
of getting a single number for the final probability we have a distribution of
values. This spread will result in a large uncertainty of P (Hi|E). This is
what every physicist knows: if the calibration constants of the detector and
the physics process are not under control, the “systematic errors” are large
and the result is of poor quality.
3.4 Conventional use of Bayes’ theorem
Bayes’ theorem follows directly from the rules of probability, and it can be
used in any kind of approach. Let us take an example:
Problem 1: A particle detector has a µ identification efficiency of 95%, and
a probability of identifying a π as a µ of 2%. If a particle is identified
as a µ, then a trigger is issued. Knowing that the particle beam is a
mixture of 90% π and 10% µ, what is the probability that a trigger is
really fired by a µ? What is the signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio?
Solution: The two hypotheses (causes) which could condition the event (ef-
fect) T (=“trigger fired”) are “µ” and “π”. They are incompatible
5The symbol ∝ could be misunderstood if one forgets that the proportionality factor
depends on all likelihoods and priors (see (13)). This means that, for a given hypothesis
Hi, as the status of information E changes, P (Hi|E,H◦) may change if P (E|Hi, H◦)
and P (Hi|H◦) remain constant, if some of the other likelihoods get modified by the new
information.
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(clearly) and exhaustive (90%+10%=100%). Then:
P (µ|T ) = P (T |µ)P◦(µ)
P (T |µ)P◦(µ) + P (T |π)P◦(π) (16)
=
0.95× 0.1
0.95× 0.1 + 0.02× 0.9 = 0.84 ,
and P (π|T ) = 0.16.
The signal to noise ratio is P (µ|T )/P (π|T ) = 5.3. It is interesting to
rewrite the general expression of the signal to noise ratio if the effect
E is observed as
S/N =
P (S|E)
P (N |E) =
P (E|S)
P (E|N) ·
P◦(S)
P◦(N)
. (17)
This formula explicitly shows that when there are noisy conditions
P◦(S)≪ P◦(N)
the experiment must be very selective
P (E|S)≫ P (E|N)
in order to have a decent S/N ratio.
(How does the S/N change if the particle has to be identified by two
independent detectors in order to give the trigger? Try it yourself, the
answer is S/N = 251.)
Problem 2: Three boxes contain two rings each, but in one of them they
are both gold, in the second both silver, and in the third one of each
type. You have the choice of randomly extracting a ring from one of
the boxes, the content of which is unknown to you. You look at the
selected ring, and you then have the possibility of extracting a second
ring, again from any of the three boxes. Let us assume the first ring
you extract is a gold one. Is it then preferable to extract the second
one from the same or from a different box?
Solution: Choosing the same box you have a 2/3 probability of getting a
second gold ring. (Try to apply the theorem, or help yourself with
intuition.)
The difference between the two problems, from the conventional statistics
point of view, is that the first is only meaningful in the frequentistic ap-
proach, the second only in the combinatorial one. They are, however, both
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acceptable from the Bayesian point of view. This is simply because in this
framework there is no restriction on the definition of probability. In many
and important cases of life and science, neither of the two conventional defi-
nitions are applicable.
3.5 Bayesian statistics: learning by experience
The advantage of the Bayesian approach (leaving aside the “little philosoph-
ical detail” of trying to define what probability is) is that one may talk about
the probability of any kind of event, as already emphasized. Moreover, the
procedure of updating the probability with increasing information is very
similar to that followed by the mental processes of rational people. Let us
consider a few examples of “Bayesian use” of Bayes’ theorem:
Example 1: Imagine some persons listening to a common friend having a
phone conversation with an unknown person Xi, and who are trying
to guess who Xi is. Depending on the knowledge they have about the
friend, on the language spoken, on the tone of voice, on the subject of
conversation, etc., they will attribute some probability to several pos-
sible persons. As the conversation goes on they begin to consider some
possible candidates for Xi, discarding others, and eventually fluctuat-
ing between two possibilities, until the status of information I is such
that they are practically sure of the identity of Xi. This experience has
happened to must of us, and it is not difficult to recognize the Bayesian
scheme:
P (Xi|I, I◦) ∝ P (I|Xi, I◦)P (Xi|I◦) . (18)
We have put the initial status of information I◦ explicitly in (18) to
remind us that likelihoods and initial probabilities depend on it. If
we know nothing about the person, the final probabilities will be very
vague, i.e. for many persons Xi the probability will be different from
zero, without necessarily favoring any particular person.
Example 2: A person X meets an old friend F in a pub. F proposes that
the drinks should be payed for by whichever of the two extracts the
card of lower value from a pack (according to some rule which is of no
interest to us). X accepts and F wins. This situation happens again
in the following days and it is always X who has to pay. What is the
probability that F has become a cheat, as the number of consecutive
wins n increases?
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The two hypotheses are: cheat (C) and honest (H). P◦(C) is low be-
cause F is an “old friend”, but certainly not zero (you know . . . ): let
us assume 5%. To make the problem simpler let us make the approxi-
mation that a cheat always wins (not very clever. . . ): P (Wn|C) = 1).
The probability of winning if he is honest is, instead, given by the rules
of probability assuming that the chance of winning at each trial is 1/2
(”why not?”, we shall come back to this point later): P (Wn|H) = 2−n.
The result
P (C|Wn) = P (Wn|C) · P◦(C)
P (Wn|C) · P◦(C) + P (Wn|H) · P◦(H)
=
1 · P◦(C)
1 · P◦(C) + 2−n · P◦(H) (19)
is shown in the following table:
n P (C|Wn) P (H|Wn)
(%) (%)
0 5.0 95.0
1 9.5 90.5
2 17.4 82.6
3 29.4 70.6
4 45.7 54.3
5 62.7 37.3
6 77.1 22.9
. . . . . . . . .
Naturally, as F continues to win the suspicion of X increases. It is
important to make two remarks:
• the answer is always probabilistic. X can never reach absolute
certainty that F is a cheat, unless he catches F cheating, or F
confesses to having cheated. This is coherent with the fact that
we are dealing with random events and with the fact that any
sequence of outcomes has the same probability (although there is
only one possibility over 2n in which F is always luckier). Making
use of P (C|Wn), X can take a decision about the next action to
take:
– continue the game, with probability P (C|Wn) of losing, with
certainty, the next time too;
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– refuse to play further, with probability P (H|Wn) of offending
the innocent friend.
• If P◦(C) = 0 the final probability will always remain zero: if X
fully trusts F , then he has just to record the occurrence of a rare
event when n becomes large.
To better follow the process of updating the probability when new
experimental data become available, according to the Bayesian scheme
“the final probability of the present inference is the initial
probability of the next one” ,
let us call P (C|Wn−1) the probability assigned after the previous win.
The iterative application of the Bayes formula yields:
P (C|Wn) = P (W |C) · P (C|Wn−1)
P (W |C) · P (C|Wn−1) + P (W |H) · P (H|Wn−1)
=
1 · P (C|Wn−1)
1 · P (C|Wn−1) + 12 · P (H|Wn−1)
, (20)
where P (W |C) = 1 and P (W |H) = 1/2 are the probabilities of each
win. The interesting result is that exactly the same values of P (C|Wn)
of (19) are obtained (try to believe it!).
It is also instructive to see the dependence of the final probability on the
initial probabilities, for a given number of wins n:
P (C|Wn)
P◦(C) (%)
n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 20
1% 24 91 99.7 99.99
5% 63 98 99.94 99.998
50% 97 99.90 99.997 99.9999
As the number of experimental observations increases the conclusions no
longer depend, practically, on the initial assumptions. This is a crucial point
in the Bayesian scheme and it will be discussed in more detail later.
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4 Hypothesis test (discrete case)
Although in conventional statistics books this argument is usually dealt with
in one of the later chapters, in the Bayesian approach this is so natural that
it is in fact the first application, as we have seen in the above examples. We
summarize here the procedure:
• probabilities are attributed to the different hypotheses using initial prob-
abilities and experimental data (via the likelihood);
• the person who makes the inference - or the “user” - will take a decision
of which he is fully responsible.
If one needs to compare two hypotheses, as in the example of the signal
to noise calculation, the ratio of the final probabilities can be taken as a
quantitative result of the test. Let us rewrite the S/N formula in the most
general case:
P (H1|E,H◦)
P (H2|E,H◦) =
P (E|H1, H◦)
P (E|H2, H◦) ·
P (H1|H◦)
P (H2|H◦) , (21)
where again we have reminded ourselves of the existence of H◦. The ratio
depends on the product of two terms: the ratio of the priors and the ratio of
the likelihoods. When there is absolutely no reason for choosing between the
two hypotheses the prior ratio is 1 and the decision depends only on the other
term, called the Bayes factor. If one firmly believes in either hypothesis, the
Bayes factor is of minor importance, unless it is zero or infinite (i.e. one and
only one of the likelihoods is vanishing). Perhaps this is disappointing for
those who expected objective certainties from a probability theory, but this
is in the nature of things.
5 Choice of the initial probabilities (discrete
case)
5.1 General criteria
The dependence of Bayesian inferences on initial probability is pointed to by
opponents as the fatal flaw in the theory. But this criticism is less severe
than one might think at first sight. In fact:
• It is impossible to construct a theory of uncertainty which is not af-
fected by this “illness”. Those methods which are advertised as being
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“objective” tend in reality to hide the hypotheses on which they are
grounded. A typical example is the maximum likelihood method, of
which we will talk later.
• as the amount of information increases the dependence on initial prej-
udices diminishes;
• when the amount of information is very limited, or completely lacking,
there is nothing to be ashamed of if the inference is dominated by a
priori assumptions;
The fact that conclusions drawn from an experimental result (and sometimes
even the “result” itself!) often depend on prejudices about the phenomenon
under study is well known to all experienced physicists. Some examples:
• when doing quick checks on a device, a single measurement is usually
performed if the value is “what it should be”, but if it is not then many
measurements tend to be made;
• results are sometimes influenced by previous results or by theoreti-
cal predictions. See for example Fig. 3 taken from the Particle Data
Book[8]. The interesting book “How experiments end”[10] discusses,
among others, the issue of when experimentalists are “happy with the
result” and stop “correcting for the systematics”;
• it can happen that slight deviations from the background are inter-
preted as a signal (e.g. as for the first claim of discovery of the Top
quark in spring ’94), while larger “signals” are viewed with suspicion if
they are unwanted by the physics “establishment”6;
• experiments are planned and financed according to the prejudices of
the moment7;
These comments are not intended to justify unscrupulous behaviour or sloppy
analysis. They are intended, instead, to remind us - if need be - that scien-
tific research is ruled by subjectivity much more than outsiders imagine. The
transition from subjectivity to “objectivity” begins when there is a large con-
sensus among the most influential people about how to interpret the results8.
In this context, the subjective approach to statistical inference at least
teaches us that every assumption must be stated clearly and all available in-
formation which could influence conclusions must be weighed with the max-
imum attempt at objectivity.
6A case, concerning the search for electron compositeness in e+e− collisions, is discussed
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Figure 3: Results on two physical quantities as a function of the publication date.
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Figure 4: R = σL/σT as a function of the Deep Inelastic Scattering variable x
as measured by experiments and as predicted by QCD.
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What are the rules for choosing the “right” initial probabilities? As one
can imagine, this is an open and debated question among scientists and
philosophers. My personal point of view is that one should avoid pedantic
discussion of the matter, because the idea of universally true priors reminds
me terribly of the famous “angels’ sex” debates.
If I had to give recommendations, they would be:
• the a priori probability should be chosen in the same spirit as the
rational person who places a bet, seeking to minimize the risk of losing;
• general principles - like those that we will discuss in a while - may
help, but since it may be difficult to apply elegant theoretical ideas in
all practical situations, in many circumstances the guess of the “expert”
can be relied on for guidance.
• avoid using as prior the results of other experiments dealing with the
same open problem, otherwise correlations between the results would
prevent all comparison between the experiments and thus the detection
of any systematic errors. I find that this point is generally overlooked
by statisticians.
5.2 Insufficient Reason and Maximum Entropy
The first and most famous criterion for choosing initial probabilities is the
simple Principle of Insufficient Reason (or Indifference Principle): if there
is no reason to prefer one hypothesis over alternatives, simply attribute the
same probability to all of them. This was stated as a principle by Laplace9
in contrast to Leibnitz’ famous Principle of Sufficient Reason, which, in sim-
ple words, states that ”nothing happens without a reason”. The indifference
principle applied to coin and die tossing, to card games or to other simple and
symmetric problems, yields to the well known rule of probability evaluation
that we have called combinatorial. Since it is impossible not to agree with
in [11].
7For a recent delightful report, see [12].
8“A theory needs to be confirmed by experiments. But it is also true that an experi-
mental result needs to be confirmed by a theory”. This sentence expresses clearly - though
paradoxically - the idea that it is difficult to accept a result which is not rationally jus-
tified. An example of results “not confirmed by the theory” are the R measurements in
Deep Inelastic Scattering shown in Fig. 4. Given the conflict in this situation, physicists
tend to believe more in QCD and use the “low-x” extrapolations (of what?) to correct the
data for the unknown values of R.
9It may help in understanding Laplace’s approach if we consider that he called the
theory of probability “good sense turned into calculation”.
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this point of view, in the cases that one judges that it does apply, the com-
binatorial “definition” of probability is recovered in the Bayesian approach
if the word “definition” is simply replaced by “evaluation rule”. We have in
fact already used this reasoning in previous examples.
A modern and more sophisticated version of the Indifference Principle
is the Maximum Entropy Principle. The information entropy function of n
mutually exclusive events, to each of which a probability pi is assigned, is
defined as
H(p1, p2, . . . pn) = −K
n∑
i=1
pi ln pi, (22)
with K a positive constant. The principle states that “in making inferences
on the basis of partial information we must use that probability distribu-
tion which has the maximum entropy subject to whatever is known[13]”.
Notice that, in this case, “entropy” is synonymous with “uncertainty”[13].
One can show that, in the case of absolute ignorance about the events Ei,
the maximization of the information uncertainty, with the constraint that∑n
i=1 pi = 1, yields the classical pi = 1/n (any other result would have been
worrying. . . ).
Although this principle is sometimes used in combination with the Bayes’
formula for inferences (also applied to measurement uncertainty, see [14]), it
will not be used for applications in these notes.
6 Random variables
In the discussion which follows I will assume that the reader is familiar with
random variables, distributions, probability density functions, expected val-
ues, as well as with the most frequently used distributions. This section is
only intended as a summary of concepts and as a presentation of the notation
used in the subsequent sections.
6.1 Discrete variables
Stated simply, to define a random variable X means to find a rule which
allows a real number to be related univocally (but not biunivocally) to an
event (E), chosen from those events which constitute a finite partition of
Ω (i.e. the events must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive). One could
write this expression X(E). If the number of possible events is finite then
the random variable is discrete, i.e. it can assume only a finite number of
values. Since the chosen set of events are mutually exclusive, the probability
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of X = x is the sum of the probabilities of all the events for which X(Ei) = x.
Note that we shall indicate the variable with X and its numerical realization
with x, and that, differently from other notations, the symbol x (in place of
n or k) is also used for discrete variables.
After this short introduction, here is a list of definitions, properties and
notations:
Probability function:
f(x) = P (X = x) . (23)
It has the following properties:
1) 0 ≤ f(xi) ≤ 1 ; (24)
2) P (X = xi ∪ X = xj) = f(xi) + f(xj) ; (25)
3)
∑
i
f(xi) = 1 . (26)
Cumulative distribution function:
F (xk) ≡ P (X ≤ xk) =
∑
xi≤xk
f(xi) . (27)
Properties:
1) F (−∞) = 0 (28)
2) F (+∞) = 1 (29)
3) F (xi)− F (xi−1) = f(xi) (30)
4) lim
ǫ→o
F (x+ ǫ) = F (x) (right side continuity) . (31)
Expected value (mean):
µ ≡ E[X] =
∑
i
xif(xi) . (32)
In general, given a function g(X) of X:
E[g(X)] =
∑
i
g(xi)f(xi) . (33)
E[·] is a linear operator:
E[aX + b] = aE[X] + b . (34)
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Variance and standard deviation: Variance:
σ2 ≡ V ar(X) = E[(X − µ)2] = E[X2]− µ2 . (35)
Standard deviation:
σ = +
√
σ2 . (36)
Transformation properties:
V ar(aX + b) = a2V ar(X) ; (37)
σ(aX + b) = |a|σ(X) . (38)
Binomial distribution: X ∼ Bn,p (hereafter “∼” stands for “follows”);
Bn,p stands for binomial with parameters n (integer) and p (real):
f(x|Bn,p) = n!
(n− x)!x!p
x(1− p)n−x ,

n = 1, 2, . . . ,∞
0 ≤ p ≤ 1
x = 0, 1, . . . , n
.
(39)
Expected value, standard deviation and variation coefficient:
µ = np (40)
σ =
√
np(1− p) (41)
v ≡ σ
µ
=
√
np(1− p)
np
∝ 1√
n
. (42)
1− p is often indicated by q.
Poisson distribution: X ∼ Pλ:
f(x|Pλ) = λ
x
x!
e−λ
{
0 < λ <∞
x = 0, 1, . . . ,∞ . (43)
(x is integer, λ is real.)
Expected value, standard deviation and variation coefficient:
µ = λ (44)
σ =
√
λ (45)
v =
1√
λ
(46)
Binomial → Poisson:
Bn,p −−−−−−−−→
n→ “∞′′
p→ “0′′
(λ = np)
Pλ . (47)
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6.2 Continuous variables: probability and density func-
tion
Moving from discrete to continuous variables there are the usual problems
with infinite possibilities, similar to those found in Zeno’s “Achilles and the
tortoise” paradox. In both cases the answer is given by infinitesimal calculus.
But some comments are needed:
• the probability of each of the realizations of X is zero (P (X = x) = 0),
but this does not mean that each value is impossible, otherwise it would
be impossible to get any result;
• although all values x have zero probability, one usually assigns differ-
ent degrees of belief to them, quantified by the probability density
function f(x). Writing f(x1) > f(x2), for example, indicates that our
degree of belief in x1 is greater than that in x2.
• The probability that a random variable lies inside a finite interval, for
example P (a ≤ X ≤ b), is instead finite. If the distance between a
and b becomes infinitesimal, then the probability becomes infinitesimal
too. If all the values of X have the same degree of belief (and not only
equal numerical probability P (x) = 0) the infinitesimal probability is
simply proportional to the infinitesimal interval dP = kdx. In the
general case the ratio between two infinitesimal probabilities around
two different points will be equal to the ratio of the degrees of belief in
the points (this argument implies the continuity of f(x) on either side
of the values). It follows that dP = f(x)dx and then
P (a ≤ X ≤ b) =
∫ b
a
f(x)dx ; (48)
• f(x) has a dimension inverse to that of the random variable.
After this short introduction, here is a list of definitions, properties and
notations:
Cumulative distribution function:
F (x) = P (X ≤ x) =
∫ x
−∞
f(x′)dx′ , (49)
or
f(x) =
dF (x)
dx
(50)
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Properties of f(x) and F (x):
• f(x) ≥ 0 ;
• ∫ +∞−∞ f(x)dx = 1 ;
• 0 ≤ F (x) ≤ 1;
• P (a ≤ X ≤ b) = ∫ b
a
f(x)dx =
∫ b
−∞ f(x)dx−
∫ a
−∞ f(x)dx
= F (b)− F (a);
• if x2 > x1 then F (x2) ≥ F (x1) .
• limx→−∞ F (x) = 0 ;
limx→+∞ F (x) = 1 ;
Expected value:
E[X] =
∫ +∞
−∞
xf(x)dx (51)
E[g(X)] =
∫ +∞
−∞
g(x)f(x)dx. (52)
Uniform distribution: 10 X ∼ K(a, b):
f(x|K(a, b)) = 1
b− a (a ≤ x ≤ b) (53)
F (x|K(a, b)) = x− a
b− a . (54)
Expected value and standard deviation:
µ =
a+ b
2
(55)
σ =
b− a√
12
. (56)
Normal (gaussian) distribution: X ∼ N (µ, σ):
f(x|N (µ, σ)) = 1√
2πσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2

−∞ < µ < +∞
0 < σ <∞
−∞ < x < +∞
,
(57)
where µ and σ (both real) are the expected value and standard devia-
tion, respectively.
10The symbols of the following distributions have the parameters within parentheses to
indicate that the variables are continuous.
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Standard normal distribution: the particular normal distribution of mean
0 and standard deviation 1, usually indicated by Z:
Z ∼ N (0, 1) . (58)
Exponential distribution: T ∼ E(τ):
f(t|E(τ)) = 1
τ
e−t/τ
{
0 ≤ τ <∞
0 ≤ t <∞ (59)
F (t|E(τ)) = 1− e−t/τ (60)
we use of the symbol t instead of x because this distribution will be
applied to the time domain.
Survival probability:
P (T > t) = 1− F (t|E(τ)) = e−t/τ (61)
Expected value and standard deviation:
µ = τ (62)
σ = τ. (63)
The real parameter τ has the physical meaning of lifetime.
Poisson ↔ Exponential: If X (= “number of counts during the time ∆t”)
is Poisson distributed then T (=“interval of time to be waited - starting
from any instant - before the first count is recorded”) is exponentially
distributed:
X ∼ f(x|Pλ) ⇐⇒ T ∼ f(x|E(τ)) (64)
(τ = ∆T
λ
) (65)
6.3 Distribution of several random variables
We only consider the case of two continuous variables (X and Y ). The
extension to more variables is straightforward. The infinitesimal element of
probability is dF (x, y) = f(x, y)dxdy, and the probability density function
f(x, y) =
∂2F (x, y)
∂x∂y
. (66)
The probability of finding the variable inside a certain area A is∫∫
A
f(x, y)dxdy . (67)
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Marginal distributions:
fX(x) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x, y)dy (68)
fY (y) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x, y)dx . (69)
The subscriptsX and Y indicate that fX(x) and fY (y) are only function
ofX and Y , respectively (to avoid fooling around with different symbols
to indicate the generic function).
Conditional distributions:
fX(x|y) = f(x, y)
fY (y)
=
f(x, y)∫
f(x, y)dx
(70)
fY (y|x) = f(x, y)
fX(x)
(71)
f(x, y) = fX(x|y)fY (y) (72)
= fY (y|x)fY (x) . (73)
Independent random variables
f(x, y) = fX(x)fY (y) (74)
(it implies f(x|y) = fX(x) and f(y|x) = fY (y) .)
Bayes’ theorem for continuous random variables
f(h|e) = f(e|h)fh(h)∫
f(e|h)fh(h)dh . (75)
Expected value:
µX = E[X] =
∫ ∫ +∞
−∞
xf(x, y)dxdy (76)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
xfX(x)dx , (77)
and analogously for Y . In general
E[g(X, Y )] =
∫ ∫ +∞
−∞
g(x, y)f(x, y)dxdy . (78)
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Variance:
σ2X = E[X
2]−E2[X] , (79)
and analogously for Y .
Covariance:
Cov(X, Y ) = E [(X −E[X]) (Y − E[Y ])] (80)
= E[XY ]−E[X]E[Y ] . (81)
If Y and Y are independent, then E[XY ] = E[X]E[Y ] and hence
Cov(X, Y ) = 0 (the opposite is true only if X, Y ∼ N (·)).
Correlation coefficient:
ρ(X, Y ) =
Cov(X, Y )√
V ar(X)V ar(Y )
(82)
=
Cov(X, Y )
σXσY
. (83)
(−1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1)
Linear combinations of random variables:
If Y =
∑
i ciXi, with ci real, then:
µY = E[Y ] =
∑
i
ciE[Xi] =
∑
i
ciµi (84)
σ2Y = V ar(Y ) =
∑
i
c2iV ar(Xi) + 2
∑
i<j
cicjCov(Xi, Xj) (85)
=
∑
i
c2iV ar(Xi) +
∑
i6=j
cicjCov(Xi, Xj) (86)
=
∑
i
c2iσ
2
i +
∑
i6=j
ρijcicjσiσj (87)
=
∑
ij
ρijcicjσiσj (88)
=
∑
ij
cicjσij . (89)
σ2Y has been written in the different ways, with increasing levels of
compactness, that can be found in the literature. In particular, (89)
uses the convention σii = σ
2
i and the fact that, by definition, ρii = 1.
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Figure 5: Example of bivariate normal distribution.
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Bivariate normal distribution: joint probability density function of X
and Y with correlation coefficient ρ (see Fig 5):
f(x, y) =
1
2πσxσy
√
1− ρ2 · (90)
exp
{
− 1
2(1− ρ2)
[
(x− µx)2
σ2x
− 2ρ(x− µx)(y − µy)
σxσy
+
(y − µy)2
σ2y
]}
.
Marginal distributions:
X ∼ N (µx, σx) (91)
Y ∼ N (µy, σy) . (92)
Conditional distribution:
f(y|x◦) = 1√
2πσy
√
1− ρ2 exp
−
(
y −
[
µy + ρ
σy
σx
(x◦ − µx)
])2
2σ2y(1− ρ2)
 ,
(93)
i.e.
Y|x◦ ∼ N
(
µy + ρ
σy
σx
(x◦ − µx) , σy
√
1− ρ2
)
: (94)
the condition X = x◦ squeezes the standard deviation and shifts the
mean of Y .
7 Central limit theorem
7.1 Terms and role
The well known central limit theorem plays a crucial role in statistics and
justifies the enormous importance that the normal distribution has in many
practical applications (this is the reason why it appears on 10 DM notes).
We have reminded ourselves in (84-85) of the expression of the mean and
variance of a linear combination of random variables
Y =
n∑
i=1
Xi
in the most general case, which includes correlated variables (ρij 6= 0). In
the case of independent variables the variance is given by the simpler, and
better known, expression
σ2Y =
n∑
i=1
c2iσ
2
i (ρij = 0, i 6= j) . (95)
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Figure 6: Central limit theorem at work: the sum of n variables, for two different
distribution, is shown. The values of n (top-down) are: 1,2,3,5,10,20,50.
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This is a very general statement, valid for any number and kind of variables
(with the obvious clause that all σi must be finite) but it does not give any
information about the probability distribution of Y . Even if all Xi follow the
same distributions f(x), f(y) is different from f(x), with some exceptions,
one of these being the normal.
The central limit theorem states that the distribution of a linear combi-
nation Y will be approximately normal if the variables Xi are independent
and σ2Y is much larger than any single component c
2
iσ
2
i from a non-normally
distributed Xi. The last condition is just to guarantee that there is no sin-
gle random variable which dominates the fluctuations. The accuracy of the
approximation improves as the number of variables n increases (the theorem
says “when n→∞”):
n→∞ =⇒ Y ∼ N
 n∑
i=1
ciXi,
(
n∑
i=1
c2iσ
2
i
)1
2
 (96)
The proof of the theorem can be found in standard text books. For practical
purposes, and if one is not very interested in the detailed behavior of the
tails, n equal to 2 or 3 may already gives a satisfactory approximation, es-
pecially if the Xi exhibits a gaussian-like shape. Look for example at Fig. 6,
where samples of 10000 events have been simulated starting from a uniform
distribution and from a crazy square wave distribution. The latter, depicting
a kind of “worst practical case”, shows that, already for n = 20 the distribu-
tion of the sum is practically normal. In the case of the uniform distribution
n = 3 already gives an acceptable approximation as far as probability inter-
vals of one or two standard deviations from the mean value are concerned.
The figure also shows that, starting from a triangular distribution (obtained
in the example from the sum of 2 uniform distributed variables), n = 2 is
already sufficient (the sum of 2 triangular distributed variables is equivalent
to the sum of 4 uniform distributed variables).
7.2 Distribution of a sample average
As first application of the theorem let us remind ourselves that a sample
average Xnof n independent variables
Xn =
n∑
i=1
1
n
Xi, (97)
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is normally distributed, since it is a linear combination of n variables Xi,
with ci = 1/n. Then:
Xn ∼ N (µXn , σXn) (98)
µXn =
n∑
i=1
1
n
µ = µ (99)
σ2
Xn
=
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
)2
σ2 =
σ2
n
(100)
σXn =
σ√
n
. (101)
This result, we repeat, is independent of the distribution of X and is already
approximately valid for small values of n.
7.3 Normal approximation of the binomial and of the
Poisson distribution
Another important application of the theorem is that the binomial and the
Poisson distribution can be approximated, for “large numbers”, by a normal
distribution. This is a general result, valid for all distributions which have
the reproductive property under the sum. Distributions of this kind are the
binomial, the Poisson and the χ2. Let us go into more detail:
Bn,p → N
(
np,
√
np(1− p)
)
The reproductive property of the binomial states
that if X1, X2, . . . , Xm are m independent variables, each following a
binomial distribution of parameter ni and p, then their sum Y =
∑
iXi
also follows a binomial distribution with parameters n =
∑
i ni and p.
It is easy to be convinced of this property without any mathematics:
just think of what happens if one tosses bunches of three, of five and
of ten coins, and then one considers the global result: a binomial with
a large n can then always be seen as a sum of many binomials with
smaller ni. The application of the central limit theorem is straight-
forward, apart from deciding when the convergence is acceptable: the
parameters on which one has to judge are in this case µ = np and the
complementary quantity µc = n(1− p) = n− µ. If they are both & 10
then the approximation starts to be reasonable.
Pλ → N
(
λ,
√
λ
)
The same argument holds for the Poisson distribution. In
this case the approximation starts to be reasonable when µ = λ & 10.
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7.4 Normal distribution of measurement errors
The central limit theorem is also important to justify why in many cases
the distribution followed by the measured values around their average is
approximately normal. Often, in fact, the random experimental error e,
which causes the fluctuations of the measured values around the unknown
true value of the physical quantity, can be seen as an incoherent sum of
smaller contributions
e =
∑
i
ei , (102)
each contribution having a distribution which satisfies the conditions of the
central limit theorem.
7.5 Caution
After this commercial in favour of the miraculous properties of the central
limit theorem, two remarks of caution:
• sometimes the conditions of the theorem are not satisfied:
– a single component dominates the fluctuation of the sum: a typical
case is the well known Landau distribution; also systematic errors
may have the same effect on the global error;
– the condition of independence is lost if systematic errors affect a
set of measurements, or if there is coherent noise;
• the tails of the distributions do exist and they are not always gaussian!
Moreover, realizations of a random variable several standard deviations
away from the mean are possible. And they show up without notice!
8 Measurement errors and measurement un-
certainty
One might assume that the concepts of error and uncertainty are well enough
known to be not worth discussing. Nevertheless a few comments are needed
(although for more details to the DIN[1] and ISO[2, 15] recommendations
should be consulted):
• the first concerns the terminology. In fact the words error and uncer-
tainty are currently used almost as synonyms:
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– “error” to mean both error and uncertainty (but nobody says
“Heisenberg Error Principle”);
– “uncertainty” only for the uncertainty.
“Usually” we understand what each other is talking about, but a more
precise use of these nouns would really help. This is strongly called
for by the DIN[1] and ISO[2, 15] recommendations. They state in fact
that
– error is “the result of a measurement minus a true value of the
measurand”: it follows that the error is usually unkown;
– uncertainty is a “parameter, associated with the result of a mea-
surement, that characterizes the dispersion of the values that could
reasonably be attributed to the measurand”;
• Within the High Energy Physics community there is an established
practice for reporting the final uncertainty of a measurement in the
form of standard deviation. This is also recommended by these norms.
However this should be done at each step of the analysis, instead of
estimating “maximum error bounds” and using them as standard de-
viation in the “error propagation”;
• the process of measurement is a complex one and it is difficult to dis-
entangle the different contributions which cause the total error. In
particular, the active role of the experimentalist is sometimes over-
looked. For this reason it is often incorrect to quote the (“nominal”)
uncertainty due to the instrument as if it were the uncertainty of the
measurement.
9 Statistical Inference
9.1 Bayesian inference
In the Bayesian framework the inference is performed calculating the final
distribution of the random variable associated to the true values of the physi-
cal quantities from all available information. Let us call x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
the n-tuple (“vector”) of observables, µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µn} the n-tuple of the
true values of the physical quantities of interest, and h = {h1, h2, . . . , hn}
the n-tuple of all the possible realizations of the influence variables Hi. The
term “influence variable” is used here with an extended meaning, to indi-
cate not only external factors which could influence the result (temperature,
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atmospheric pressure, and so on) but also any possible calibration constant
and any source of systematic errors. In fact the distinction between µ and
h is artificial, since they are all conditional hypotheses. We separate them
simply because at the end we will “marginalize” the final joint distribution
functions with respect to µ, integrating the joint distribution with respect to
the other hypotheses considered as influence variables.
The likelihood of the sample x being produced from h and µ and the
initial probability are
f(x|µ, h,H◦)
and
f◦(µ, h) = f(µ, h|H◦) , (103)
respectively. H◦ is intended to remind us, yet again, that likelihoods and pri-
ors - and hence conclusions - depend on all explicit and implicit assumptions
within the problem, and in particular on the parametric functions used to
model priors and likelihoods. To simplify the formulae, H◦ will no longer be
written explicitly.
Using the Bayes formula for multidimensional continuous distributions
(an extension of ( 75)) we obtain the most general formula of inference
f(µ, h|x) = f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ, h)∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ, h)dµdh , (104)
yielding the joint distribution of all conditional variables µ and h which are
responsible for the observed sample x. To obtain the final distribution of µ
one has to integrate (104) over all possible values of h, obtaining
f(µ|x) =
∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ, h)dh∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ, h)dµdh . (105)
Apart from the technical problem of evaluating the integrals, if need be nu-
merically or using Monte Carlo methods11, (105) represents the most general
form of hypothetical inductive inference. The word “hypothetical” reminds
us of H◦.
When all the sources of influence are under control, i.e. they can be
assumed to take a precise value, the initial distribution can be factorized by
11This is conceptually what experimentalists do when they change all the parameters of
the Monte Carlo simulation in order to estimate the “systematic error”.
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a f◦(µ) and a Dirac δ(h− h◦), obtaining the much simpler formula
f(µ|x) =
∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ)δ(h− h◦)dh∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ)δ(h− h◦)dµdh
=
f(x|µ, h◦)f◦(µ)∫
f(x|µ, h◦)f◦(µ)dµ
. (106)
Even if formulae (105-106) look complicated because of the multidimensional
integration and of the continuous nature of µ, conceptually they are identical
to the example of the dE/dx measurement discussed in Sec. 9.1
The final probability density function provides the most complete and
detailed information about the unknown quantities, but sometimes (almost
always . . . ) one is not interested in full knowledge of f(µ), but just in a
few numbers which summarize at best the position and the width of the
distribution (for example when publishing the result in a journal in the most
compact way). The most natural quantities for this purpose are the expected
value and the variance, or the standard deviation. Then the Bayesian best
estimate of a physical quantity is:
µ̂i = E[µi] =
∫
µif(µ|x)dµ (107)
σ2µi ≡ V ar(µi) = E[µ2i ]− E2[µi] (108)
σµi ≡ +
√
σ2µi (109)
When many true values are inferred from the same data the numbers
which synthesize the result are not only the expected values and variances,
but also the covariances, which give at least the (linear!) correlation coeffi-
cients between the variables:
ρij ≡ ρ(µi, µj) = Cov(µi, µj)
σµiσµj
. (110)
In the following sections we will deal in most cases with only one value to
infer:
f(µ|x) = . . . , (111)
9.2 Bayesian inference and maximum likelihood
We have already said that the dependence of the final probabilities on the
initial ones gets weaker as the amount of experimental information increases.
45
Without going into mathematical complications (the proof of this statement
can be found for example in[3]) this simply means that, asymptotically, what-
ever f◦(µ) one puts in (106), f(µ|x) is unaffected. This is “equivalent” to
dropping f◦(µ) from (106). This results in
f(µ|x) ≈ f(x|µ, h◦)∫
f(x|µ, h◦)dµ
. (112)
Since the denominator of the Bayes formula has the technical role of properly
normalizing the probability density function, the result can be written in the
simple form
f(µ|x) ∝ f(x|µ, h◦) ≡ L(x;µ, h◦) . (113)
Asymptotically the final probability is just the (normalized) likelihood! The
notation L is that used in the maximum likelihood literature (note that, not
only does f become L, but also “|” has been replaced by “;”: L has no
probabilistic interpretation in conventional statistics.)
If the mean value of f(µ|x) coincides with the value for which f(µ|x) has
a maximum, we obtain the maximum likelihood method. This does not mean
that the Bayesian methods are “blessed” because of this achievement, and
that they can be used only in those cases where they provide the same results.
It is the other way round, the maximum likelihood method gets justified when
all the the limiting conditions of the approach (→ insensitivity of the result
from the initial probability → large number of events) are satisfied.
Even if in this asymptotic limit the two approaches yield the same nu-
merical results, there are differences in their interpretation:
• the likelihood, after proper normalization, has a probabilistic meaning
for Bayesians but not for frequentists; so Bayesians can say that the
probability that µ is in a certain interval is, for example, 68%, while
this statement is blasphemous for a frequentist (“the true value is a
constant” from his point of view);
• frequentists prefer to choose µ̂L the value which maximizes the likeli-
hood, as estimator. For Bayesians, on the other hand, the expected
value µ̂B = E[µ] (also called the prevision) is more appropriate. This
is justified by the fact that the assumption of the E[µ] as best estimate
of µ minimizes the risk of a bet (always keep the bet in mind!). For ex-
ample, if the final distribution is exponential with parameter τ (let us
think for a moment of particle decays) the maximum likelihood method
would recommend betting on the value t = 0, whereas the Bayesian ap-
proach suggests the value t = τ . If the terms of the bet are “whoever
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gets closest wins” what is the best strategy? And then, what is the
best strategy if the terms are “whoever gets the exact value wins”?
But now think of the probability of getting the exact value and of the
probability of getting closest?
9.3 The dog, the hunter and the biased Bayesian esti-
mators
One of the most important tests to judge how good an estimator is, is whether
or not it is correct (not biased). Maximum likelihood estimators are usually
correct, while Bayesian estimators - analysed within the maximum likelihood
framework - often are not. This could be considered a weak point - however
the Bayes estimators are simply naturally consistent with the status of in-
formation before new data become available. In the maximum likelihood
method, on the other hand, it is not clear what the assumptions are.
Let us take an example which shows the logic of frequentistic inference
and why the use of reasonable prior distributions yields results which that
frame classifies as distorted. Imagine meeting a hunting dog in the country.
Let us assume we know that there is a 50% probability of finding the dog
within a radius of 100 meters centered on the position of the hunter (this is
our likelihood). Where is the hunter? He is with 50% probability within a
radius of 100 meters around the position of the dog, with equal probability
in all directions. “Obvious”. This is exactly the logic scheme used in the
frequentistic approach to build confidence regions from the estimator (the
dog in this example). This however assumes that the hunter can be anywhere
in the country. But now let us change the status of information: “the dog is
by a river”; “the dog has collected a duck and runs in a certain direction”;
“the dog is sleeping”; “the dog is in a field surrounded by a fence through
which he can pass without problems, but the hunter cannot”. Given any
new condition the conclusion changes. Some of the new conditions change
our likelihood, but some others only influence the initial distribution. For
example, the case of the dog in an enclosure inaccessible to the hunter is
exactly the problem encountered when measuring a quantity close to the
edge of its physical region, which is quite common in frontier research.
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10 Choice of the initial probability density
function
10.1 Difference with respect to the discrete case
The title of this section is similar to that of Sec. 5, but the problem and the
conclusions will be different. There we said that the Indifference Principle
(or, in its refined modern version, the Maximum Entropy Principle) was
a good choice. Here there are problems with infinities and with the fact
that it is possible to map an infinite number of points contained in a finite
region onto an infinite number of points contained in a larger or smaller
finite region. This changes the probability density function. If, moreover,
the transformation from one set of variables to the other is not linear (see,
e.g. Fig. 7) what is uniform in one variable (X) is not uniform in another
variable (e.g. Y = X2). This problem does not exist in the case of discrete
variables, since if X = xi has a probability f(xi) then Y = x
2
i has the same
probability. A different way of stating the problem is that the Jacobian of
the transformation squeezes or stretches the metrics, changing the probability
density function.
We will not enter into the open discussion about the optimal choice of the
distribution. Essentially we shall use the uniform distribution, being careful
to employ the variable which “seems” most appropriate for the problem, but
You may disagree - surely with good reason - if You have a different kind of
experiment in mind.
The same problem is also present, but well hidden, in the maximum
likelihood method. For example, it is possible to demonstrate that, in the
case of normally distributed likelihoods, a uniform distribution of the mean
µ is implicitly assumed (see section 11). There is nothing wrong with this,
but one should be aware of it.
10.2 Bertrand paradox and angels’ sex
A good example to help understand the problems outlined in the previous
section is the so-called Bertrand paradox:
Problem: Given a circle of radius R and a chord drawn randomly on it,
what is the probability that the length L of the chord is smaller than
R?
Solution 1: Choose “randomly” two points on the circumference and draw
a chord between them: ⇒ P (L < R) = 1/3 = 0.33 .
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Figure 7: Examples of variable changes.
49
Solution 2: Choose a straight line passing through the center of the circle;
then draw a second line, orthogonal to the first, and which intersects
it inside the circle at a “random” distance from the center: ⇒ P (L <
R) = 1−√3/2 = 0.13 .
Solution 3: Choose “randomly” a point inside the circle and draw a straight
line orthogonal to the radius that passes through the chosen point ⇒
P (L < R) = 1/4 = 0.25;
Your solution: . . . . . . . . . ?
Question: What is the origin of the paradox?
Answer: The problem does not specify how to “randomly” choose the chord.
The three solutions take a uniform distribution: along the circumfer-
ence; along the the radius; inside the area. What is uniform in one
variable is not uniform in the others!
Question: Which is the right solution?
In principle you may imagine an infinite number of different solutions. From
a physicist’s viewpoint any attempt to answer this question is a waste of time.
The reason why the paradox has been compared to the Byzantine discussions
about the sex of angels is that there are indeed people arguing about it. For
example, there is a school of thought which insists that Solution 2 is the right
one.
In fact this kind of paradox, together with abuse of the Indifference Prin-
ciple for problems like “what is the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow
morning” threw a shadow over Bayesian methods at the end of last century.
The maximum likelihood method, which does not make explicit use of prior
distributions, was then seen as a valid solution to the problem. But in re-
ality the ambiguity of the proper metrics on which the initial distribution
is uniform has an equivalent on the arbitrariness of the variable used in the
likelihood function. In the end, what was criticized when it was stated ex-
plicitly in the Bayes formula is accepted passively when it is hidden in the
maximum likelihood method.
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11 Normally distributed observables
11.1 Final distribution, prevision and credibility inter-
vals of the true value
The first application of the Bayesian inference will be that of a normally
distributed quantity. Let us take a data sample q of n1 measurements, of
which we calculate the average qn1 . In our formalism qn1 is a realization of
the random variable Qn1. Let us assume we know the standard deviation
σ of the variable Q, either because n1 is very large and it can be estimated
accurately from the sample or because it was known a priori (we are not going
to discuss in these notes the case of small samples and unknown variance).
The property of the average (see 7.2) tells us that the likelihood f(Qn1|µ, σ)
is gaussian:
Qn1 ∼ N (µ, σ/
√
n1). (114)
To simplify the following notation, let us call x1 this average and σ1 the
standard deviation of the average:
x1 = qn1 (115)
σ1 = σ/
√
n1 , (116)
We then apply (106) and get
f(µ|x1,N (·, σ1)) =
1√
2πσ1
e
− (x1−µ)
2
2σ2
1 f◦(µ)∫
1√
2πσ1
e
− (x1−µ)2
2σ2
1 f◦(µ)dµ
. (117)
At this point we have to make a choice for f◦(µ). A reasonable choice is to
take, as a first guess, a uniform distribution defined over a “large” interval
which includes x1. It is not really important how large the interval is, for a
few σ1’s away from x1 the integrand at the denominator tends to zero because
of the gaussian function. What is important is that a constant f◦(µ) can be
simplified in (117) obtaining
f(µ|x1,N (·, σ1)) =
1√
2πσ1
e
− (x1−µ)
2
2σ21∫∞
−∞
1√
2πσ1
e
− (x1−µ)2
2σ21 dµ
. (118)
The integral in the denominator is equal to unity, since integrating with
respect to µ1 is equivalent to integrating with respect to x1. The final result
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is then
f(µ) = f(µ|x1,N (·, σ1)) = 1√
2πσ1
e
− (µ−x1)
2
2σ2
1 : (119)
• the true value is normally distributed around x1;
• its best estimate (prevision) is E[µ] = x1;
• its variance is σµ = σ1;
• the “confidence intervals”, or credibility intervals, in which there is a
certain probability of finding the true value are easily calculable:
Probability level credibility interval
(confidence level) (confidence interval)
(%)
68.3 x1 ± σ1
90.0 x1 ± 1.65σ1
95.0 x1 ± 1.96σ1
99.0 x1 ± 2.58σ1
99.73 x1 ± 3σ1
11.2 Combination of several measurements
Let us imagine making a second set of measurements of the physical quantity,
which we assume unchanged from the previous set of measurements. How will
our knowledge of µ change after this new information? Let us call x2 = qn2
and σ2 = σ
′/
√
n2 the new average and standard deviation of the average (σ
′
may be different from σ of the sample of numerosity n1). Applying Bayes’
theorem a second time we now have to use as initial distribution the final
probability of the previous inference:
f(µ|x1, σ1, x2, σ2,N ) =
1√
2πσ2
e
− (x2−µ)
2
2σ2
2 f(µ|x1,N (·, σ1))∫
1√
2πσ2
e
− (x2−µ)2
2σ22 f(µ|x1,N (·, σ1))dµ
.
(120)
The integral is not as simple as the previous one, but still feasible analytically.
The final result is
f(µ|x1, σ1, x2, σ2,N ) = 1√
2πσA
e
− (µ−xA)
2
2σ2
A , (121)
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where
xA =
x1/σ
2
1 + x2/σ
2
2
1/σ21 + 1/σ
2
2
, (122)
1
σ2A
=
1
σ21
+
1
σ22
. (123)
One recognizes the famous formula of the weighted average with the inverse
of the variances, usually obtained from maximum likelihood. Some remarks:
• Bayes’ theorem updates the knowledge about µ in an automatic and
natural way;
• if σ1 ≫ σ2 (and x1 is not “too far” from x2) the final result is only
determined by the second sample of measurements. This suggests that
an alternative vague a priori distribution can be, instead of the uniform,
a gaussian with a large enough variance and a reasonable mean;
• the combination of the samples requires a subjective judgement that
the two samples are really coming from the same true value µ. We
will not discuss this point in these notes, but a hint on how to proceed
is: take the inference on the difference of two measurements, D, as
explained at the end of Section 13.1 and judge yourself if D = 0 is
consistent with the probability density function of D.
11.3 Measurements close to the edge of the physical
region
A case which has essentially no solution in the maximum likelihood approach
is when a measurement is performed at the edge of the physical region and
the measured value comes out very close to it, or even on the unphysical
region. Let us take a numeric example:
Problem: An experiment is planned to measure the (electron) neutrino
mass. The simulations show that the mass resolution is 3.3 eV/c2,
largely independent of the mass value, and that the measured mass is
normally distributed around the true mass12. The mass value which
results from the elaboration,13 and corrected for all known systematic
12In reality, often what is normally distributed is m2 instead of m. Holding this hypoth-
esis the terms of the problem change and a new solution should be worked out, following
the trace indicated in this example.
13We consider detector and analysis machinery as a black box, no matter how compli-
cated it was, and treat the numerical outcome as a result of a direct measurement[1].
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effects, is x = −5.41 eV/c2. What have we learned about the neutrino
mass?
Solution: Our a priori value of the mass is that it is positive and not too
large (otherwise it would already have been measured in other exper-
iments). One can take any vague distribution which assigns a prob-
ability density function between 0 and 20 or 30 eV/c2. In fact, if an
experiment having a resolution of σ = 3.3 eV/c2 has been planned and
financed by rational people, with the hope of finding evidence of non
negligible mass it means that the mass was thought to be in that range.
If there is no reason to prefer one of the values in that interval a uniform
distribution can be used, for example
f◦K(m) = k = 1/30 (0 ≤ m ≤ 30) . (124)
Otherwise, if one thinks there is a greater chance of the mass having
small rather than high values, a prior which reflects such an assumption
could be chosen, for example a half normal with σ◦ = 10 eV
f◦N(m) =
2√
2πσ◦
exp
[
−m
2
2σ2◦
]
(m ≥ 0) , (125)
or a triangular distribution
f◦T (m) =
1
450
(30− x) (0 ≤ m ≤ 30) . (126)
Let us consider for simplicity the uniform distribution
f(m|x, f◦K) =
1√
2πσ
exp
[
− (m−x)2
2σ2
]
k∫ 30
0
1√
2πσ
exp
[
− (m−x)2
2σ2
]
kdµ
(127)
=
19.8√
2πσ
exp
[
−(m− x)
2
2σ2
]
(0 ≤ m ≤ 30) .(128)
The value which has the highest degree of belief is m = 0, but f(m)
is non vanishing up to 30 eV/c2 (even if very small). We can define an
interval, starting from m = 0, in which we believe that m should have
a certain probability. For example this level of probability can be 95%.
One has to find the value m◦ for which the cumulative function F (m◦)
equals 0.95. This value of m is called the upper limit (or upper bound).
The result is
m < 3.9 eV/c2 at 0.95% C.L. . (129)
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If we had assumed the other initial distributions the limit would have
been in both cases
m < 3.7 eV/c2 at 0.95% C.L. , (130)
practically the same (especially if compared with the experimental res-
olution of 3.3 eV/c2).
Comment: Let us assume an a priori function sharply peaked at zero and
see what happens. For example it could be of the kind
f◦S(m) ∝ 1
m
. (131)
To avoid singularities in the integral, let us take a power of m a bit
greater than −1, for example −0.99, and let us limit its domain to 30,
getting
f◦S(m) =
0.01 · 300.01
m0.99
. (132)
The upper limit becomes
m < 0.006 eV/c2 at 0.95% C.L. . (133)
Any experienced physicist would find this result ridiculous. The upper
limit is less then 0.2% of the experimental resolution; like expecting to
resolve objects having dimensions smaller than a micron with a design
ruler! Notice instead that in the previous examples the limit was always
of the order of magnitude of the experimental resolution σ. As f◦S(m)
becomes more and more peaked at zero (power of x → 1) the limit
gets smaller and smaller. This means that, asymptotically, the degree
of belief that m = 0 is so high that whatever you measure you will
conclude that m = 0: you could use the measurement to calibrate
the apparatus! This means that this choice of initial distribution was
unreasonable.
12 Counting experiments
12.1 Binomially distributed quantities
Let us assume we have performed n trials and obtained x favorable events.
What is the probability of the next event? This situation happens frequently
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Figure 8: Probability density function of the binomial parameter p, having ob-
served x successes in n trials.
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when measuring efficiencies, branching ratios, etc. Stated more generally, one
tries to infer the “constant and unknown probability”14 of an event occurring.
Where we can assume that the probability is constant and the observed
number of favorable events are binomially distributed, the unknown quantity
to be measured is the parameter p of the binomial. Using Bayes’ theorem we
get
f(p|x, n,B) = f(x|Bn,p)f◦(p)∫ 1
0
f(x|Bn,p)f◦(p)dp
=
n!
(n−x)!x!p
x(1− p)n−xf◦(p)∫ 1
0
n!
(n−x)!x!p
x(1− p)n−xf◦(p)dp
=
px(1− p)n−x∫ 1
0
px(1− p)n−xdp , (134)
where an initial uniform distribution has been assumed. The final distri-
bution is known to statisticians as β distribution since the integral at the
denominator is the special function called β, defined also for real values of x
and n (technically this is a β with parameters a = x+ 1 and b = n− x+ 1).
In our case these two numbers are integer and the integral becomes equal to
x!(n− x)!/(n+ 1)!. We then get
f(p|x, n,B) = (n + 1)!
x!(n− x)!p
x(1− p)n−x . (135)
14This concept, which is very close to the physicist’s mentality, is not correct from the
probabilistic - cognitive - point of view. According to the Bayesian scheme, in fact, the
probability changes with the new observations. The final inference of p, however, does not
depend on the particular sequence yielding x successes over n trials. This can be seen in
the next table where fn(p) is given as a function of the number of trials n, for the three
sequences which give 2 successes (indicated by “1”) in three trials (the use of (135) is
anticipated):
Sequence
n 011 101 110
0 1 1 1
1 2(1− p) 2p 2p
2 6p(1− p) 6p(1− p) 3p2
3 12p2(1− p) 12p2(1− p) 12p2(1− p)
This important result, related to the concept of interchangeability, “allows” a physicist who
is reluctant to give up the concept “unknown constant probability”, to see the problem
from his point of view, ensuring that the same numerical result is obtained.
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The expected value and the variance of this distribution are:
E[p] =
x+ 1
n+ 2
(136)
V ar(p) =
(x+ 1)(n− x+ 1)
(n + 3)(n+ 2)2
(137)
=
x+ 1
n+ 2
(
n
n+ 2
− x+ 1
n+ 2
)
1
n+ 3
= E[p]
(
n
n+ 2
− E[p]
)
1
n+ 3
. (138)
The value of p for which f(p) has the maximum is instead pm = x/n. The
expression E[p] gives the prevision of the probability for the (n+1)-th event
occurring and is called the “recursive Laplace formula”, or “Laplace’s rule of
succession”.
When x and n become large, and 0 ≪ x ≪ n, f(p) has the following
asymptotic properties:
E[p] ≈ pm = x
n
; (139)
V ar(p) ≈ x
n
(
1− x
n
) 1
n
=
pm(1− pm)
n
; (140)
σp ≈
√
pm(1− pm)
n
: (141)
p ∼ N (pm, σp) . (142)
Under these conditions the frequentistic “definition” of probability (x/n) is
recovered.
Let us see two particular situations: when x = 0 and x = n. In these
cases one gives the result as upper or lower limits, respectively. Let us sketch
the solutions:
• x=n:
f(n|Bn,p) = pn; (143)
f(p|x = n,B) = p
n∫ 1
0
pndp
= (n+ 1) · pn; (144)
F (p|x = n,B) = pn+1 . (145)
To get the 95% lower bound (limit):
F (p◦|x = n,B) = 0.05 ,
p◦ =
n+1
√
0.05 . (146)
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An increasing number of trials n constrain more and more p around 1.
• x=0:
f(0|Bn,p) = (1− p)n; (147)
f(p|x = 0, n,B) = (1− p)
n∫ 1
0
(1− p)ndp = (n+ 1) · (1− p)
n; (148)
F (p|x = 0, n,B) = 1− (1− p)n+1 . (149)
To get the 95% upper bound (limit):
F (p◦|x = 0, n,B) = 0.95;
p◦ = 1− n+1
√
0.05 . (150)
The following table shows the 95% C.L. limits as a function of n. The
Poisson approximation, to be discussed in the next section, is also shown.
Probability level = 95%
n x = n x = 0
binomial binomial Poisson approx.
( p◦ = 3/n )
3 p ≥ 0.47 p ≤ 0.53 p ≤ 1
5 p ≥ 0.61 p ≤ 0.39 p ≤ 0.6
10 p ≥ 0.76 p ≤ 0.24 p ≤ 0.3
50 p ≥ 0.94 p ≤ 0.057 p ≤ 0.06
100 p ≥ 0.97 p ≤ 0.029 p ≤ 0.03
1000 p ≥ 0.997 p ≤ 0.003 p ≤ 0.003
To show in this simple case how f(p) is updated by the new information,
let us imagine we have performed two experiments. The results are x1 = n1
and x2 = n2, respectively. Obviously the global information is equivalent to
x = x1 + x2 and n = n1 + n2, with x = n. We then get
f(p|x = n,B) = (n+ 1)pn = (n1 + n2 + 1)pn1+n2 . (151)
A different way of proceeding would have been to calculate the final distri-
bution from the information x1 = n1
f(p|x1 = n1,B) = (n1 + 1)pn1 , (152)
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and feed it as initial distribution to the next inference:
f(p|x1 = n1, x2 = n2,B) = p
n2f(p|x1 = n1,B)∫ 1
0
pn2f(p|x1 = n1,B)dp
(153)
=
pn2(n1 + 1)p
n1∫ 1
0
pn2(n1 + 1)pn1dp
(154)
= (n1 + n2 + 1)p
n1+n2 , (155)
getting the same result.
12.2 Poisson distributed quantities
As is well known, the typical application of the Poisson distribution is in
counting experiments such as source activity, cross sections, etc. The un-
known parameter to be inferred is λ. Applying Bayes formula we get
f(λ|x,P) =
λxe−λ
x!
f◦(λ)∫∞
0
λxe−λ
x!
f◦(λ)dλ
. (156)
Assuming15 f◦(λ) constant up to a certain λmax ≫ x and making the integral
by parts we obtain
f(λ|x,P) = λ
xe−λ
x!
(157)
F (λ|x,P) = 1− e−λ
(
x∑
n=0
λn
n!
)
, (158)
where the last result has been obtained integrating (157) also by parts. Fig. 9
shows how to build the credibility intervals, given a certain measured number
of counts x. Fig. 10 shows some numerical examples.
f(λ) has the following properties:
• the expected values, variance, value of maximum probability are
E[λ] = x+ 1 (159)
V ar(λ) = x+ 2 (160)
λm = x ; (161)
15There is a school of thought according to which the most appropriate function is
f(λ) ∝ 1/λ. If You think that it is reasonable for your problem, it may be a good
prior. Claiming that this is “the Truth” is one of the many claims of the angels’ sex
determinations. For didactical purposes a uniform distribution is more than enough.
Some comments about the 1/λ prescription will be given when discussing the particular
case x = 0.
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Figure 9: Poisson parameter λ inferred from an observed number x of counts.
the fact that the best estimate of λ in the Bayesian sense is not the
intuitive value x but x + 1 should neither surprise, nor disappoint us:
according to the initial distribution used “there are always more pos-
sible values of λ on the right side than on the left side of x”, and they
pull the distribution to their side; the full information is always given
by f(λ) and the use of the mean is just a rough approximation; the
difference from the “desired” intuitive value x in units of the standard
deviation goes as 1/
√
n+ 2 and becomes immediately negligible;
• when x becomes large we get:
E[λ] ≈ λm = x ; (162)
V ar(λ) ≈ λm = x ; (163)
σλ ≈
√
x ; (164)
λ ∼ N (x,√x) . (165)
(164) is one of the most familar formulae used by physicists to assess
the uncertainty of a measurement, although it is sometimes misused.
Let us conclude with a special case: x = 0. As one might imagine, the
inference is highly sensitive to the initial distribution. Let us assume that
the experiment was planned with the hope of observing something, i.e. that
it could detect a handful of events within its lifetime. With this hypothesis
one may use any vague prior function not strongly peaked at zero. We have
already come across a similar case in section 11.3, concerning the upper limit
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Figure 10: Examples of f(λ|xi).
of the neutrino mass. There it was shown that reasonable hypotheses based
on the positive attitude of the experimentalist are almost equivalent and that
they give results consistent with detector performances. Let us use then the
uniform distribution
f(λ|x = 0,P) = e−λ (166)
F (λ|x = 0,P) = 1− e−λ (167)
λ < 3 at 95% C.L. . (168)
13 Uncertainty due to unknown systematic
errors
13.1 Example: uncertainty of the instrument scale off-
set
In our scheme any quantity of influence of which we don’t know the exact
value is a source of systematic error. It will change the final distribution of µ
and hence its uncertainty. We have already discussed the most general case
in 9.1. Let us make a simple application making a small variation to the
example in section 11.1: the “zero” of the instrument is not known exactly,
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Figure 11: Upper limit to λ having observed 0 events.
owing to calibration uncertainty. This can be parametrized assuming that
its true value Z is normally distributed around 0 (i.e. the calibration was
properly done!) with a standard deviation σZ . Since, most probably, the
true value of µ is independent from the true value of Z, the initial joint
probability density function can be written as the product of the marginal
ones:
f◦(µ, z) = f◦(µ)f◦(z) = k
1√
2πσZ
exp
[
− z
2
2σ2Z
]
. (169)
Also the likelihood changes with respect to 114:
f(x1|µ, z) = 1√
2πσ1
exp
[
−(x1 − µ− z)
2
2σ21
]
. (170)
Putting all the pieces together and making use of (105) we finally get
f(µ|x1, . . . , f◦(z)) =
∫
1√
2πσ1
exp
[
− (x1−µ−z)2
2σ21
]
1√
2πσZ
exp
[
− z2
2σ2
Z
]
dz∫∫
1√
2πσ1
exp
[
− (x1−µ−z)2
2σ21
]
1√
2πσZ
exp
[
− z2
2σ2Z
]
dµdz
.
Integrating16 we get
f(µ) = f(µ|x1, . . . , f◦(z)) = 1√
2π
√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
exp
[
− (µ− x1)
2
2(σ21 + σ
2
Z)
]
.
(171)
16It may help to know that∫ +∞
−∞
exp
[
bx− x
2
a2
]
dx =
√
a2π exp
[
a2b2
4
]
.
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The result is that f(µ) is still a gaussian, but with a larger variance. The
global standard uncertainty is the quadratic combination of that due to the
statistical fluctuation of the data sample and the uncertainty due to the
imperfect knowledge of the systematic effect:
σ2tot = σ
2
1 + σ
2
Z . (172)
This result is well known, although there are still some “old-fashioned”
recipes which require different combinations of the contributions to be per-
formed.
One has to notice that in this framework it makes no sense to speak of
“statistical” and “systematical” uncertainties, as if they were of a different
nature. They have the same probabilistic nature: Qn1 is around µ with a
standard deviation σ1, and Z is around 0 with standard deviation σZ . What
distinguishes the two components is how the knowledge of the uncertainty
is gained: in one case (σ1) from repeated measurements; in the second case
(σZ) the evaluation was done by somebody else (the constructor of the in-
strument), or in a previous experiment, or guessed from the knowledge of
the detector, or by simulation, etc. This is the reason why the ISO Guide [2]
prefers the generic names Type A and Type B for the two kinds of contribu-
tion to global uncertainty. In particular the name “systematic uncertainty”
should be avoided, while it is correct to speak about “uncertainty due to a
systematic effect”.
13.2 Correction for known systematic errors
It is easy to be convinced that if our prior knowledge about Z was of the
kind
Z ∼ N (z◦, σZ) (173)
the result would have been
µ ∼ N
(
x1 − z◦,
√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
)
, (174)
i.e. one has first to correct the result for the best value of the systematic error
and then include in the global uncertainty a term due to imperfect knowledge
about it. This is a well known and practised procedure, although there are
still people who confuse z◦ with its uncertainty.
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13.3 Measuring two quantities with the same instru-
ment having an uncertainty of the scale offset
Let us take an example which is a bit more complicated (at least from the
mathematical point of view) but conceptually very simple and also very com-
mon in laboratory practice. We measure two physical quantities with the
same instrument, assumed to have an uncertainty on the “zero”, modeled
with a normal distribution as in the previous sections. For each of the quan-
tities we collect a sample of data under the same conditions, which means
that the unknown offset error does not change from one set of measurements
to the other. Calling µ1 and µ2 the true values, x1 and x2 the sample aver-
ages, σ1 and σ2 the average’s standard deviations, and Z the true value of
the “zero”, the initial probability density and the likelihood are
f◦(µ1, µ2, z) = f◦(µ1)f◦(µ2)f◦(z) = k
1√
2πσZ
exp
[
− z
2
2σ2Z
]
(175)
and
f(x1, x2|µ1, µ2, z) = 1√
2πσ1
exp
[
−(x1 − µ1 − z)
2
2σ21
]
1√
2πσ2
exp
[
−(x2 − µ2 − z)
2
2σ22
]
=
1
2πσ1σ2
exp
[
−1
2
(
(x1 − µ1 − z)2
σ21
+
(x2 − µ2 − z)2
σ22
)]
, (176)
respectively. The result of the inference is now the joint probability density
function of µ1 and µ2:
f(µ1, µ2|x1, x2, σ1, σ2, f◦(z)) =
∫
f(x1, x2|µ1, µ2, z)f◦(µ1, µ2, z)dz∫∫∫
f(x1, x2|µ1, µ2, z)f◦(µ1, µ2, z)dµ1dµ2dz ,(177)
where expansion of the functions has been omitted for the sake of clarity.
Integrating we get
f(µ1, µ2) =
1
2π
√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z
√
1− ρ2 (178)
exp
{
− 1
2(1− ρ2)
[
(µ1 − x1)2
σ21 + σ
2
Z
− 2ρ (µ1 − x1)(µ2 − x2)√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z
+
(µ2 − x2)2
σ22 + σ
2
Z
]}
.
where
ρ =
σ2Z√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z
. (179)
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If σZ vanishes then (178) has the simpler expression
f(µ1, µ2) −−−→
σZ→0
1√
2πσ1
exp
[
−(µ1 − x1)
2
2σ21
]
1√
2πσ2
exp
[
−(µ2 − x2)
2
2σ22
]
,
(180)
i.e. if there is no uncertainty on the offset calibration the joint density func-
tion then f(µ1, µ2) is equal to the product of two independent normal func-
tions, i.e. µ1 and µ2 are independent. In the general case we have to conclude
that:
• the effect of the common uncertainty σZ makes the two values correlated,
since they are affected by a common unknown systematic error; the
correlation coefficient is always non negative (ρ ≥ 0), as intuitively
expected from the definition of systematic error;
• the joint density function is a multinormal distribution of parameters
x1, σµ1 =
√
σ21 + σ
2
Z , x2, σµ2 =
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z , and ρ (see example of
Fig. 5);
• the marginal distributions are still normal:
µ1 ∼ N
(
x1,
√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
)
(181)
µ2 ∼ N
(
x2,
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z
)
; (182)
• the covariance between µ1 and µ2 is
Cov(µ1, µ2) = ρσµ1σµ2
= ρ
√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z = σ
2
Z . (183)
• the distribution of any function g(µ1, µ2) can be calculated using the
standard methods of probability theory. For example, one can demon-
strate that the sum S = µ1 + µ2 and the difference D = µ1 − µ2 are
also normally distributed (see also the introductory discussion to the
central limit theorem and section 16 for the calculation of averages and
standard deviations):
S ∼ N
(
x1 + x2,
√
σ21 + σ
2
2 + (2σZ)
2
)
(184)
D ∼ N
(
x1 − x2,
√
σ21 + σ
2
2
)
. (185)
The result can be interpreted in the following way:
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– the uncertainty on the difference does not depend on the common
offset uncertainty: whatever the value of the true “zero” is, it
cancels in differences;
– in the sum, instead, the effect of the common uncertainty is some-
what amplified since it enters “in phase” in the global uncertainty
of each of the quantities.
13.4 Indirect calibration
Let us use the result of the previous section to solve another typical problem
of measurements. Suppose that after (or before, it doesn’t matter) we have
done the measurements of x1 and x2 and we have the final result, summarized
in (178), we know the “exact” value of µ1 (for example we perform the
measurement on a reference). Let us call it µ◦1. Will this information provide
a better knowledge of µ2? In principle yes: the difference between x1 and
µ◦1 defines the systematic error (the true value of the “zero” Z). This error
can then be subtracted from µ2 to get a corrected value. Also the overall
uncertainty of µ2 should change, intuitively it “should” decrease, since we
are adding new information. But its value doesn’t seem to be obvious, since
the logical link between µ◦1 and µ2 is µ
◦
1 → Z → µ2.
The problem can be solved exactly using the concept of conditional prob-
ability density function f(µ2|µ◦1) (see (93-94)). We get
µ2|µ◦1 ∼N
x2 + σ2Z
σ21 + σ
2
Z
(µ◦1 − x1),
√
σ22 +
(
1
σ21
+
1
σ2Z
)−1 .
(186)
The best value of µ2 is shifted by an amount ∆, with respect to the measured
value x2, which is not exactly x1 − µ◦1, as was na¨ıvely guessed, and the
uncertainty depends on σ2, σZ and σ1. It is easy to be convinced that the
exact result is more resonable than the (suggested) first guess. Let us rewrite
∆ in two different ways:
∆ =
σ2Z
σ21 + σ
2
Z
(µ◦1 − x1) (187)
=
1
1
σ21
+ 1
σ2Z
[
1
σ21
· (x1 − µ◦1) +
1
σ2Z
· 0
]
. (188)
• Eq. (187) shows that one has to apply the correction x1 − µ◦1 only if
σ1 = 0. If instead σZ = 0 there is no correction to be applied, since the
instrument is perfectly calibrated. If σ1 ≈ σZ the correction is half of
the measured difference between x1 and µ
◦
1;
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• Eq. (188) shows explicitly what is going on and why the result is
consistent with the way we have modeled the uncertainties. In fact
we have performed two independent calibrations: one of the offset and
one of µ1. The best estimate of the true value of the “zero” Z is the
weighted average of the two measured offsets;
• the new uncertainty of µ2 (see (186)) is a combination of σ2 and the un-
certainty of the weighted average of the two offsets. Its value is smaller
than what one would have with only one calibration and, obviously,
larger than that due to the sampling fluctuations alone:
σ2 ≤
√
σ22 +
σ21σ
2
Z
σ21 + σ
2
Z
≤
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z . (189)
13.5 Counting measurements in presence of background
As an example of a different kind of systematic effect, let us think of counting
experiments in the presence of background. For example we are searching
for a new particle, we make some selection cuts and count x events. But
we also expect an average number of background events λB◦ ± σB, where σB
is the standard uncertainty of λB◦ , not to be confused with
√
λB◦ . What
can we say about λS, the true value of the average number associated to
the signal? First we will treat the case on which the determination of the
expected number of background events is well known (σB/λB◦ ≪ 1), and
then the general case:
σB/λB◦ ≪ 1 : the true value of the sum of signal and background is λ =
λS + λB◦ . The likelihood is
P (x|λ) = e
−λλx
x!
. (190)
Applying Bayes’s theorem we have
f(λS|x, λB◦) =
e−(λB◦+λS)(λB◦ + λS)
xf◦(λS)∫∞
0
e−(λB◦+λS)(λB◦ + λS)xf◦(λS)dλS
. (191)
Choosing again f◦(λS) uniform (in a reasonable interval) this gets sim-
plified. The integral at the denominator can be done easily by parts
and the final result is:
f(λS|x, λB◦) =
e−λS(λB◦ + λS)
x
x!
∑x
n=0
λnB◦
n!
(192)
F (λS|x, λB◦) = 1−
e−λS
∑x
n=0
(λB◦+λS)
n
n!∑x
n=0
λnB◦
n!
. (193)
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From (192-193) it is possible to calculate in the usual way the best
estimate and the credibility intervals of λS. Two particular cases are
of interest:
• if λB◦ = 0 then formulae (157-158) are recovered. In such a case
one measured count is enough to claim for a signal (if somebody is
willing to believe that really λB◦ = 0 without any uncertainty. . . );
• if x = 0 then
f(λ|x, λB◦) = e−λS , (194)
independently of λB◦ . This result is not really obvious.
Any g(λB◦) : In the general case, the true value of the average number of
background events λB is unknown. We only known that it is distributed
around λB◦ with standard deviation σB and probability density function
g(λB), not necessarily a gaussian. What changes with respect to the
previous case is the initial distribution, now a joint function of λS and
of λB. Assuming λB and λS independent the prior density function is
f◦(λS, λB) = f◦(λS)g◦(λB) . (195)
We leave f◦ in the form of a joint distribution to indicate that the result
we shall get is the most general for this kind of problem. The likelihood,
on the other hand, remains the same as in the previous example. The
inference of λS is done in the usual way, applying Bayes’ theorem and
marginalizing with respect to λS:
f(λS|x, g◦(λB)) =
∫
e−(λB+λS)(λB + λS)xf◦(λS, λB)dλB∫∫
e−(λB+λS)(λB + λS)xf◦(λS, λB)dλSdλB
.
(196)
The previous case (formula (192)) is recovered if the only value allowed
for λB is λB◦ and f◦(λS) is uniform:
f◦(λS, λB) = kδ(λB − λB◦) . (197)
14 Approximate methods
14.1 Linearization
We have seen in the above examples how to use the general formula (105)
for practical applications. Unfortunately, when the problem becomes more
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complicated one starts facing integration problems. For this reason approx-
imate methods are generally used. We will derive the approximation rules
consistently with the approach followed in these notes and then the resulting
formulae will be compared with the ISO recommendations. To do this, let us
neglect for a while all quantities of influence which could produce unknown
systematic errors. In this case (105) can be replaced by (106), which can
be further simplified if we remember that correlations between the results
are originated by unknown systematic errors. In absence of these, the joint
distribution of all quantities µ is simply the product of marginal ones:
fRi(µi) =
∏
i
fRi(µi) , (198)
with
fRi(µi) = fRi(µi|xi, h◦) =
f(xi|µi, h◦)f◦(µi)∫
f(xi|µi, h◦)f◦(µi)dµi
. (199)
The symbol fRi(µi) indicates that we are dealing with raw values
17 evaluated
at h = h◦. Since for any variation of h the inferred values of µi will change,
it is convenient, to name with the same subscript R the quantity obtained
for h◦:
fRi(µi) −→ fRi(µRi) . (200)
Let us indicate with µ̂Ri and σRi the best estimates and the standard
uncertainty of the raw values:
µ̂Ri = E[µRi ] (201)
σ2Ri = V ar(µRi) . (202)
For any possible configuration of conditioning hypotheses h, corrected values
µi are obtained:
µi = µRi + gi(h) . (203)
The function which relates the corrected value to the raw value and to the
systematic effects has been denoted by gi not to be confused with a proba-
bility density function. Expanding (203) in series around h◦ we finally arrive
at the expression which will allow us to make the approximated evaluations
of uncertainties:
µi = µRi +
∑
l
∂gi
∂hl
(hl − h◦l) + . . . (204)
17The choice of the adjective “raw” will become clearer in a later on.
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(All derivatives are evaluated at {µ̂Ri, h◦}. To simplify the notation a similar
convention will be used in the following formulae).
Neglecting the terms of the expansion above the first order, and taking
the expected values, we get
µ̂i = E[µi]
≈ µ̂Ri ; (205)
σ2µi = E
[
(µi − E[µi])2
]
≈ σ2Ri +
∑
l
(
∂gi
∂hl
)2
σ2hl{
+2
∑
l<m
(
∂gi
∂hl
)(
∂gi
∂hm
)
ρlmσhlσhm
}
; (206)
Cov(µi, µj) = E [(µi −E[µi])(µj −E[µj ])]
≈
∑
l
(
∂gi
∂hl
)(
∂gj
∂hl
)
σ2hl{
+2
∑
l<m
(
∂gi
∂hl
)(
∂gj
∂hm
)
ρlmσhlσhm
}
. (207)
The terms included within {·} vanish if the unknown systematic errors are
uncorrelated, and the formulae become simpler. Unfortunately, very often
this is not the case, as when several calibration constants are simultaneously
obtained from a fit (for example, in most linear fits slop and intercept have
a correlation coefficient close to −0.9).
Sometimes the expansion (204) is not performed around the best values
of h but around their nominal values, in the sense that the correction for the
known value of the systematic errors has not yet been applied (see section
13.2). In this case (204) should be replaced by
µi = µRi +
∑
l
∂gi
∂hl
(hl − hNl) + . . . (208)
where the subscript N stands for nominal. The best value of µi is then
µ̂i = E[µi]
≈ µ̂Ri + E
[∑
l
∂gi
∂hl
(hl − hNl)
]
= µ̂Ri +
∑
l
δµil . (209)
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(206) and (207) instead remain valid, with the condition that the derivative
is calculated at hN . If ρlm = 0 it is possible to rewrite (206) and (207) in the
following way, which is very convenient for practical applications:
σ2µi ≈ σ2Ri +
∑
l
(
∂gi
∂hl
)2
σ2hl (210)
= σ2Ri +
∑
l
u2il ; (211)
Cov(µi, µj) ≈
∑
l
(
∂gi
∂hl
)(
∂gj
∂hl
)
σ2hl (212)
=
∑
l
sijl
∣∣∣∣∂gi∂hl
∣∣∣∣ σhl ∣∣∣∣∂gj∂hl
∣∣∣∣ σhl (213)
=
∑
l
sijluilujl (214)
=
∑
l
Covl(µi, µj) . (215)
uil is the component to the standard uncertainty due to effect hl. sijl is equal
to the product of signs of the derivatives, which takes into account whether
the uncertainties are positively or negatively correlated.
To summarize, when systematic effects are not correlated with each other,
the following quantities are needed to evaluate the corrected result, the com-
bined uncertainties and the correlations:
• the raw µ̂Ri and σRi ;
• the best estimates of the corrections δµil for each systematic effect hl;
• the best estimate of the standard deviation uil due to the imperfect
knowledge of the systematic effect;
• for any pair {µi, µj} the sign of the correlation sijl due to the effect hl.
In High Energy Physics applications it is frequently the case that the
derivatives appearing in (209-213) cannot be calculated directly, as for ex-
ample when hl are parameters of a simulation program, or acceptance cuts.
Then variations of µ
i
are usually studied varying a particular hl within a rea-
sonable interval, holding the other influence quantities at the nominal value.
δµil and uil are calculated from the interval ±∆±i of variation of the true
value for a given variation ±∆±hl of hl and from the probabilistic meaning of
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the intervals (i.e. from the assumed distribution of the true value). This em-
pirical procedure for determining δµil and uil has the advantage that it can
take into account non linear effects, since it directly measures the difference
µ̂i − µ̂Ri for a given difference hl − hNl .
Some examples are given in section 14.4, and two typical experimental
applications will be discussed in more detail in section 16.
14.2 BIPM and ISO recommendations
In this section we compare the results obtained in the previous section
with the recommendations of the Bureau International des Poids et Me´sures
(BIPM) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) on
“the expression of experimental uncertainty”.
1. The uncertainty in the result of a measurement generally consists
of several components which may be grouped into two categories
according to the way in which their numerical value is estimated:
A: those which are evaluated by statistical methods;
B: those which are evaluated by other means.
There is not always a simple correspondence between the classifi-
cation into categories A or B and the previously used classification
into “random” and “systematic” uncertainties. The term “sys-
tematic uncertainty” can be misleading and should be avoided.
The detailed report of the uncertainty should consist of a com-
plete list of the components, specifying for each the method used
to obtain its numerical result.
Essentially the first recommendation states that all uncertainties can
be treated probabilistically. The distinction between types A and B
is subtle and can be misleading if one thinks of “statistical methods”
as synonymous with “probabilistic methods” - as currently done in
High Energy Physics. Here “statistical” has the classical meaning of
repeated measurements.
2. The components in category A are characterized by the estimated
variances s2i (or the estimated “standard deviations” si) and the
number of degrees of freedom νi. Where appropriate, the covari-
ances should be given.
The estimated variances correspond to σ2Ri of the previous section. The
degrees of freedom have are related to small samples and to the Stu-
dent t distribution. The problem of small samples is not discussed in
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these notes, but clearly this recommendation is a relic of frequentistic
methods. With the approach followed in theses notes there is no need
to talk about degrees of freedom, since the Bayesian inference defines
the final probability function f(µ) completely.
3. The components in category B should be characterized by quan-
tities u2j , which may be considered as approximations to the cor-
responding variances, the existence of which is assumed. The
quantities u2j may the treated like variances and the quantities
uj like standard deviations. Where appropriate, the covariances
should be treated in a similar way.
Clearly, this recommendation is meaningful only in a Bayesian frame-
work.
4. The combined uncertainty should be characterized by the numeri-
cal value obtained by applying the usual method for the combina-
tion of variances. The combined uncertainty and its components
should be expressed in the form of “standard deviations”.
This is what we have found in (206-207).
5. If, for particular applications, it is necessary to multiply the com-
bined uncertainty by a factor to obtain an overall uncertainty, the
multiplying factor used must always stated.
This last recommendation states once more that the uncertainty is “by
default” the standard deviation of the true value distribution. Any
other quantity calculated to obtain a credibility interval with a certain
probability level should be clearly stated.
To summarize, these are the basic ingredients of the BIPM/ISO recommen-
dations:
subjective definition of probability: it allows variances to be assigned
conceptually to any physical quantity which has an uncertain value;
uncertainty as standard deviation
• it is “standard”;
• the rule of combination (85-88) applies to standard deviations and
not to confidence intervals;
combined standard uncertainty: it is obtained by the usual formula of
“error propagation” and it makes use on variances, covariances and
first derivatives;
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central limit theorem: it makes, under proper conditions, the true value
normally distributed if one has several sources of uncertainty.
Consultation of the Guide[2] is recommended for further explanations
about the justification of the norms, for the description of evaluation proce-
dures, as well for as examples. I would just like to end this section with some
examples of the evaluation of type B uncertainties and with some words of
caution concerning the use of approximations and of linearization.
14.3 Evaluation of type B uncertainties
The ISO Guide states that
For estimate xi of an input quantity
18 Xi that has not been obtained
from repeated observations, the . . . standard uncertainty ui is evalu-
ated by scientific judgement based on all the available information on
the possible variability of Xi. The pool of information may include
• previous measurement data;
• experience with or general knowledge of the behaviour and prop-
erties of relevant materials and instruments;
• manufacturer’s specifications;
• data provided in calibration and other certificates;
• uncertainties assigned to reference data taken from handbooks.
14.4 Examples of type B uncertainties
1. A manufacturer’s calibration certificate states that the uncertainty, de-
fined as k standard deviations, is “±∆”:
u =
∆
k
.
2. A result is reported in a publication as x±∆, stating that the average
has been performed on 4 measurements and the uncertainty is a 95%
confidence interval. One has to conclude that the confidence interval
has been calculated using the Student t:
u =
∆
3.18
.
18By “input quantity” the ISO Guide mean any of the contributions hl or µRi which
enter into (206-207).
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3. a manufacturer’s specification states that the error on a quantity should
not exceed ∆. With this limited information one has to assume a
uniform distribution:
u =
2∆√
12
=
∆√
3
;
4. A physical parameter of a Monte Carlo is believed to lie in the interval of
±∆ around its best value, but not with uniform distribution: the proba-
bility that the parameter is at center is higher than than that it is at the
edges of the interval. With this information a triangular distribution
can be reasonably assumed:
u =
∆√
6
.
Note that the coefficient in front of ∆ changes from the 0.58 of the pre-
vious example to the 0.41 of this. If the interval ±∆ were a 3σ interval
then the coefficient would have been equal to 0.33. These variations -
to be considered extreme - are smaller than the statistical fluctuations
of empirical standard deviations estimated from ≈ 10 measurements.
This shows that one should not be worried that the type B uncertain-
ties are less accurate than type A, especially if one tries to model the
distribution of the physical quantity honestly.
5. The absolute energy calibration of an electromagnetic calorimeter mod-
ule is not exactly known and it is estimated to be between the nominal
one and +10%. The “statistical” resolution is known by test beam
measurements to be 18%/
√
E/GeV. What is the uncertainty on the
energy measurement of an electron which has apparently released 30
GeV?
• The energy has to be corrected for the best estimate of the cali-
bration constant: +5%:
ER = 31.5± 1.0GeV .
– assuming a uniform distribution of the true calibration con-
stant: u = 31.5× 0.1/√12 = 0.9GeV:
E = 31.5± 1.3GeV ;
– assuming a triangular distribution: u = 1.3GeV:
E = 31.5± 1.6GeV ;
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hl µR1 = 1.50± 0.07 µR2 = 1.80± 0.08 correlation
l model ∆±1l δµ1l u1l ∆
±
2l
δµ2l u2l Covl(µ1, µ2)
1 normal ±0.05 0 0.05 0 0 0 0
2 normal 0 0 0 ±0.08 0.00 0.08 0
3 normal
{
+0.10
−0.04 +0.03 0.07
{
+0.12
−0.05 +0.035 0.085 +0.0060
4 uniform
{
+0.00
−0.15 −0.075 0.04
{
+0.07
−0.00 +0.035 0.02 −0.0008
5 triangular ±0.10 0.00 0.04 ±0.02 0.00 0.008 +0.0003
6 triangular
{
+0.02
−0.08 −0.03 0.02
{
+0.01
−0.03 −0.010 0.008 +0.0016
7 uniform
{
+0.10
−0.06 +0.02 0.05
{
+0.14
−0.06 +0.04 0.06 +0.0030
8 triangular
{
+0.03
−0.02 +0.005 0.010 ±0.03 0.000 0.012 +0.00012
“
∑
hl
” normal −0.05 0.12 +0.10 0.13 +0.010
µ1 = 1.45± 0.14 µ2 = 1.90± 0.15 +0.010
(µ1 = 1.45± 0.10± 0.10) (µ2 = 1.90± 0.11± 0.10) (ρ = +0.49)
µ2 + µ1 = 3.35± 0.25
µ2 − µ1 = 0.45± 0.15
µ = 1.65± 0.12
Table 3: Example of the result of two physical quantities corrected by several
systematic effects (arbitrary units).
• interpreting the maximum deviation from the nominal calibration
as uncertainty (see comment at the end of section 13.2):
E = 30.0± 1.0± 3.0GeV→ E = 30.0± 3.2GeV ;
As already remarked earlier in these notes, while reasonable as-
sumptions (in this case the first two) give consistent results, this
is not true if one makes inconsistent use of the information just
for the sake of giving “safe” uncertainties.
6. As a more realistic and slightly more complicated example, let us take
the case of a measurement of two physical quantities performed with the
same apparatus. The result, before the correction for systematic effects
and only with typeA uncertainties is µR1 = 1.50±0.07 and µR2 = 1.80±
0.08 (arbitrary units). Let us assume that the measurements depend
on eight influence quantities hl, and that most of them influence both
physical quantities. For simplicity we consider hl to be independent
from each other. Tab. 3 gives the details of correction for the
systematic effects and of the uncertainty evaluation, performed using
(209), (211) and (213). To see the importance of the correlations, the
result of the sum and of the difference of µ1 and µ2 is also reported.
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In order to split the final result into “individual” and “common” un-
certainty (between parenthesis in Tab. 3) we have to remember that,
if the error is additive, the covariance between µ1 and µ2 is given by
the variance of the unknown systematic error (see 183).
The average µ between µ1 and µ2, assuming it has a physical meaning,
can be evaluated either using the results of section 16, or simply calcu-
lating the average weighted with the inverse of the variances due to the
individual uncertainties, and then adding quadratically the common
uncertainty at the end. Also µ is reported in Tab. 3.
14.5 Caveat concerning a blind use of approximate
methods
The mathematical apparatus of variances and covariances of (206-207) is
often seen as the most complete description of uncertainty and in most cases
used blindly in further uncertainty calculations. It must be clear, however,
that this is just an approximation based on linearization. If the function
which relates the corrected value to the raw value and the systematic effects
is not linear then the linearization may cause trouble. An interesting case is
discussed in section 16.
There is another problem which may arise from the simultaneous use of
Bayesian estimators and approximate methods. Let us introduce the problem
with an example.
Example 1: 1000 independent measurements of the efficiency of a detector
have been performed (or 1000 measurements of branching ratio, if you
prefer). Each measurement was carried out on a base of 100 events and
each time 10 favorable events were observed (this obviously strange -
though not impossible - but it simplifies the calculations). The result
of each measurement will be (see (136-138)):
ǫ̂i =
10 + 1
100 + 2
= 0.1078 (216)
σ(ǫi) =
√
11 · 91
103 · 1022 = 0.031 ; (217)
Combining the 1000 results using the standard weighted average pro-
cedure gives
ǫ = 0.1078± 0.0010 . (218)
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Alternatively, taking the complete set of results to be equivalent to
100000 trials with 10000 favorable events, the combined result is
ǫ′ = 0.10001± 0.0009 . (219)
(the same as if one had used the Bayes theorem iteratively to infer f(ǫ)
from the the partial 1000 results.) The conclusions are in disagreement
and the first result is clearly mistaken.
The same problem arises in the case of inference of the Poisson distribution
parameter λ and, in general, whenever f(µ) is not symmetrical around E[µ].
Example 2: Imagine an experiment running continuously for one year, search-
ing for monopoles and identifying none. The consistency with zero can
be stated either quoting E[λ] = 1 and σλ = 2, or a 95% upper limit
λ < 3. In terms of rate (number of monopoles per day) the result
would be either E[r] = 2.7 · 10−3, σ(r) = 5.5 · 10−3, or an upper limit
r < 8.2 ·10−3. It easy to show that, if we take the 365 results for each of
the running days and combine them using the standard weighted aver-
age, we get r = 1.0± 0.1 monopoles/day! This absurdity is not caused
by the Bayesian method, but by the standard rules for combining the
results (the weighted average formulae (122) and (123) are derived from
the normal distribution hypothesis). Using Bayesian inference would
have led to a consistent and reasonable result no matter how the 365
days of running had been subdivided for partial analysis.
This suggests that in some cases it could be preferable to give the result in
terms of the value of µ which maximizes f(µ) (pm and λm of sections 12.1 and
12.2). This way of presenting the results is similar to that suggested by the
maximum likelihood approach, with the difference that for f(µ) one should
take the final probability density function and not simply the likelihood.
Since it is practically impossible to summarize the outcome of an inference
in only two numbers (best value and uncertainty), a description of the method
used to evaluate them should be provided, except when f(µ) is approximately
normally distributed (fortunately this happens most of the time).
15 Indirect measurements
Conceptually this is a very simple task in the Bayesian framework, whereas
the frequentistic one requires a lot of gymnastics going back and forward from
the logical level of true values to the logical level of estimators. If one accepts
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that the true values are just random variables19, then, calling Y a function
of other quantities X, each having a probability density function f(x), the
probability density function of Y f(y) can be calculated with the standard
formulae which follow from the rules probability. Note that in the approach
presented in these notes uncertainties due to systematic effects are treated in
the same way as indirect measurements. It is worth repeating that there is
no conceptual distinction between various components of the measurement
uncertainty. When approximations are sufficient, formulae (206) and (207)
can be used.
Let us take an example for which the linearization does not give the right
result:
Example: The speed of a proton is measured with a time-of-flight system.
Find the 68, 95 and 99% probability intervals for the energy, knowing
that β = v/c = 0.9971, and that distance and time have been measured
with a 0.2% accuracy.
The relation
E =
mc2√
1− β2
is strongly non linear. The results given by the approximated method
and the correct one are, respectively:
C.L. linearization correct
(%) E (GeV) E (GeV)
68 6.4 ≤ E ≤ 18 8.8 ≤ E ≤ 64
95 0.7 ≤ E ≤ 24 7.2 ≤ E <∞
99 0. ≤ E ≤ 28 6.6 ≤ E <∞
16 Covariance matrix of experimental results
16.1 Building the covariance matrix of experimental
data
In physics applications, it is rarely the case that the covariance between
the best estimates of two physical quantities20, each given by the arithmetic
19To make the formalism lighter, let us call both the random variable associated to the
quantity and the quantity itself by the same name Xi (instead of µxi).
20In this section[16] the symbol Xi will indicate the variable associated to the i-th
physical quantity and Xik its k-th direct measurement; xi the best estimate of its value,
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average of direct measurements (xi = Xi =
1
n
∑n
k=1Xik), can be evaluated
from the sample covariance of the two averages
Cov(xi, xj) =
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
k=1
(Xik −X i)(Xjk −Xj) . (220)
More frequent is the well understood case in which the physical quantities
are obtained as a result of a χ2 minimization, and the terms of the inverse
of the covariance matrix are related to the curvature of χ2 at its minimum:(
V −1
)
ij
=
1
2
∂2χ2
∂Xi∂Xj
∣∣∣∣
xi,xj
. (221)
In most cases one determines independent values of physical quantities
with the same detector, and the correlation between them originates from
the detector calibration uncertainties. Frequentistically, the use of (220) in
this case would correspond to having a “sample of detectors”, with each of
which a measurement of all the physical quantities is performed.
A way of building the covariance matrix from the direct measurements
is to consider the original measurements and the calibration constants as a
common set of independent and uncorrelated measurements, and then to cal-
culate corrected values that take into account the calibration constants. The
variance/covariance propagation will automatically provide the full covari-
ance matrix of the set of results. Let us derive it for two cases that happen
frequently, and then proceed to the general case.
16.1.1 Offset uncertainty
Let xi ± σi be the i = 1 . . . n results of independent measurements and VX
the (diagonal) covariance matrix. Let us assume that they are all affected
by the same calibration constant c, having a standard uncertainty σc. The
corrected results are then yi = xi+c. We can assume, for simplicity, that the
most probable value of c is 0, i.e. the detector is well calibrated. One has to
consider the calibration constant as the physical quantity Xn+1, whose best
estimate is xn+1 = 0. A term VXn+1,n+1 = σ
2
c must be added to the covariance
matrix.
The covariance matrix of the corrected results is given by the transfor-
mation:
VY =MVXM
T , (222)
obtained by an average over many direct measurements or indirect measurements, σi the
standard deviation, and yi the value corrected for the calibration constants. The weighted
average of several xi will be denoted by x.
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where Mij =
∂Yi
∂Xj
∣∣∣
xj
. The elements of VY are given by
VYkl =
∑
ij
∂Yk
∂Xi
∣∣∣∣
xi
∂Yl
∂Xj
∣∣∣∣
xj
VXij . (223)
In this case we get:
σ2(Yi) = σ
2
i + σ
2
c (224)
Cov(Yi, Yj) = σ
2
c (i 6= j) (225)
ρij =
σ2c√
σ2i + σ
2
c
√
σ2j + σ
2
c
(226)
=
1√
1 +
(
σi
σc
)2√
1 +
(
σj
σc
)2 , (227)
reobtaining the results of section 13.3. The total uncertainty on the single
measurement is given by the combination in quadrature of the individual and
the common standard uncertainties, and all the covariances are equal to σ2c .
To verify, in a simple case, that the result is reasonable, let us consider only
two independent quantities X1 and X2, and a calibration constant X3 = c,
having an expected value equal to zero. From these we can calculate the
correlated quantities Y1 and Y2 and finally their sum (S ≡ Z1) and difference
(D ≡ Z2). The results are:
VY =
(
σ21 + σ
2
c σ
2
c
σ2c σ
2
2 + σ
2
c
)
(228)
(229)
(230)
VZ =
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 + 4 · σ2c σ21 − σ22
σ21 − σ22 σ21 + σ22
)
. (231)
It follows that
σ2(S) = σ21 + σ
2
2 + (2 · σc)2 (232)
σ2(D) = σ21 + σ
2
2 , (233)
as intuitively expected.
16.1.2 Normalization uncertainty
Let us consider now the case where the calibration constant is the scale factor
f , known with a standard uncertainty σf . Also in this case, for simplicity
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and without losing generality, let us suppose that the most probable value of
f is 1. Then Xn+1 = f , i.e. xn+1 = 1, and VXn+1,n+1 = σ
2
f . Then
σ2(Yi) = σ
2
i + σ
2
fx
2
i (234)
Cov(Yi, Yj) = σ
2
fxixj (i 6= j) (235)
ρij =
xixj√
x2i +
σ2i
σ2f
√
x2j +
σ2j
σ2f
(236)
|ρij | = 1√
1 +
(
σi
σfxi
)2√
1 +
(
σj
σfxj
)2 (237)
. (238)
To verify the results let us consider two independent measurements X1 and
X2, let us calculate the correlated quantities Y1 and Y2, and finally their
product (P ≡ Z1) and their ratio (R ≡ Z2):
VY =
 σ21 + σ2f · x21 σ2f · x1 · x2
σ2f · x1 · x2 σ22 + σ2f · x2
 (239)
(240)
(241)
VZ =
 σ
2
1 · x22 + σ22 · x21 + 4 · σ2f · x21 · x22 σ21 − σ22 · x
2
1
x22
σ21 − σ22 · x
2
1
x22
σ21
x22
+ σ22 · x
2
1
x42
 . (242)
It follows that:
σ2(P ) = σ21 · x22 + σ22 · x21 + (2 · σf · x1 · x2)2 (243)
σ2(R) =
σ21
x22
+ σ22 ·
x21
x42
. (244)
Just as an unknown common offset error cancels in differences and is en-
hanced in sums, an unknown normalization error has a similar effect on the
ratio and the product. It is also interesting to calculate the standard uncer-
tainty of a difference in case of a normalization error:
σ2(D) = σ21 + σ
2
2 + σ
2
f · (x1 − x2)2 . (245)
The contribution from an unknown normalization error vanishes if the two
values are equal.
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16.1.3 General case
Let us assume there are n independently measured values xi and m cali-
bration constants cj with their covariance matrix Vc. The latter can also be
theoretical parameters influencing the data, and moreover they may be corre-
lated, as usually happens if, for example, they are parameters of a calibration
fit. We can then include the cj in the vector that contains the measurements
and Vc in the covariance matrix VX :
x =

x1
...
xn
c1
...
cm

, VX =

σ21 0 · · · 0
0 σ22 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · 0
0 0 · · · σ2n
0 Vc
 . (246)
The corrected quantities are obtained from the most general function
Yi = Yi(Xi, c) (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) , (247)
and the covariance matrixVY from the covariance propagationVY =MVXM
T .
As a frequently encountered example, we can think of several normaliza-
tion constants, each affecting a subsample of the data - as is the case where
each of several detectors measures a set of physical quantities. Let us con-
sider consider just three quantities (Xi) and three uncorrelated normalization
standard uncertainties (σfj ), the first one common to X1 and X2, the second
to X2 and X3 and the third to all three. We get the following covariance
matrix:
σ21 +
(
σ2f1 + σ
2
f3
) · x21 (σ2f1 + σ2f3) · x1 · x2 σ2f3 · x1 · x3(
σ2f1 + σ
2
f3
) · x1 · x2 σ22 + (σ2f1 + σ2f2 + σ2f3) · x22 (σ2f2 + σ2f3) · x2 · x3
σ2f3 · x1 · x3
(
σ2f2 + σ
2
f3
) · x2 · x3 σ23 + (σ2f2 + σ2f3) · x23
 .
16.2 Use and misuse of the covariance matrix to fit
correlated data
16.2.1 Best estimate of the true value from two correlated values.
Once the covariance matrix is built one uses it in a χ2 fit to get the parameters
of a function. The quantity to be minimized is χ2, defined as
χ2 = ∆TV−1∆ , (248)
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where ∆ is the vector of the differences between the theoretical and the
experimental values. Let us consider the simple case in which two results of
the same physical quantity are available, and the individual and the common
standard uncertainty are known. The best estimate of the true value of the
physical quantity is then obtained by fitting the constant Y = k through the
data points. In this simple case the χ2 minimization can be performed easily.
We will consider the two cases of offset and normalization uncertainty. As
before, we assume that the detector is well calibrated, i.e. the most probable
value of the calibration constant is, respectively for the two cases, 0 and 1,
and hence yi = xi
16.2.2 Offset uncertainty
Let x1 ± σ1 and x2 ± σ2 be the two measured values, and σc the common
standard uncertainty. The χ2 is
χ2 =
1
D
[
(x1 − k)2 · (σ22 + σ2c ) + (x2 − k)2 · (σ21 + σ2c ) (249)
−2 · (x1 − k) · (x2 − k) · σ2c
]
, (250)
where D = σ21 ·σ22+(σ21+σ22) ·σ2c is the determinant of the covariance matrix.
Minimizing χ2 and using the second derivative calculated at the minimum
we obtain the best value of k and its standard deviation:
k̂ =
x1 · σ22 + x2 · σ21
σ21 + σ
2
2
(= x) (251)
(252)
σ2(k̂) =
σ21 · σ22
σ21 + σ
2
2
+ σ2c . (253)
The most probable value of the physical quantity is exactly what one obtains
from the average x weighted with the inverse of the individual variances.
Its overall uncertainty is the quadratic sum of the standard deviation of the
weighted average and the common one. The result coincides with the simple
expectation.
16.2.3 Normalization uncertainty
Let x1 ± σ1 and x2 ± σ2 be the two measured values, and σf the common
standard uncertainty on the scale. The χ2 is
χ2 =
1
D
[
(x1 − k)2 · (σ22 + x22 · σ2f ) + (x2 − k)2 · (σ21 + x21 · σ2f) (254)
−2 · (x1 − k) · (x2 − k) · x1 · x2 · σ2f
]
, (255)
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where D = σ21 ·σ22+(x21 ·σ22+x22 ·σ21) ·σ2f . We obtain in this case the following
result:
k̂ =
x1 · σ22 + x2 · σ21
σ21 + σ
2
2 + (x1 − x2)2 · σ2f
(256)
(257)
σ2(k̂) =
σ21 · σ22 + (x21 · σ22 + x22 · σ21) · σ2f
σ21 + σ
2
2 + (x1 − x2)2 · σ2f
. (258)
With respect to the previous case, k̂ has a new term (x1 − x2)2 · σ2f in the
denominator. As long as this is negligible with respect to the individual
variances we still get the weighted average x, otherwise a smaller value is
obtained. Calling r the ratio between k̂ and x, we obtain
r =
k̂
x
=
1
1 + (x1−x2)
2
σ21+σ
2
2
· σ2f
. (259)
Written in this way, one can see that the deviation from the simple average
value depends on the compatibility of the two values and on the normalization
uncertainty. This can be understood in the following way: as soon as the
two values are in some disagreement, the fit starts to vary the normalization
factor - in a hidden way - and to squeeze the scale by an amount allowed by
σf , in order to minimize the χ
2. The reason the fit prefers, normalization
factors smaller than 1 under these conditions lies in the standard formalism of
the covariance propagation, where only first derivatives are considered. This
implies that the individual standard deviations are not rescaled by lowering
the normalization factor, but the points get closer.
Example 1. Consider the results of two measurements, 8.0 · (1± 2%) and
8.5 · (1± 2%), having a 10% common normalization error. Assuming
that the two measurements refer to the same physical quantity, the
best estimate of its true value can be obtained by fitting the points to
a constant. Minimizing χ2 with V estimated empirically by the data,
as explained in the previous section, one obtains a value of 7.87± 0.81,
which is surprising to say the least, since the most probable result is
outside the interval determined by the two measured values.
Example 2. A real life case of this strange effect which occurred during
the global analysis of the R ratio in e+e− performed by the CELLO
collaboration[17], is shown in Fig. 12. The data points represent the
averages in energy bins of the results of the PETRA and PEP experi-
ments. They are all correlated and the error bars show the total error
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Figure 12: R measurements from PETRA and PEP experiments with the best
fits of QED+QCD to all the data (full line) and only below 36GeV (dashed line).
All data points are correlated (see text).
(see [17] for details). In particular, at the intermediate stage of the
analysis shown in the figure, an overall 1% systematic error due the-
oretical uncertainties was included in the covariance matrix. The R
values above 36GeV show the first hint of the rise of the e+e− cross
section due to the Z◦ pole. At that time it was very interesting to
prove that the observation was not just a statistical fluctuation. In
order to test this, the R measurements were fitted with a theoretical
function having no Z◦ contributions, using only data below a certain
energy. It was expected that a fast increase of χ2 per number of degrees
of freedom ν would be observed above 36GeV, indicating that a the-
oretical prediction without Z◦ would be inadequate for describing the
high energy data. The surprising result was a “repulsion” (see Fig. 12)
between the experimental data and the fit: including the high energy
points with larger R a lower curve was obtained, while χ2/ν remained
almost constant.
To see the source of this effect more explicitly let us consider an alterna-
tive way often used to take the normalization uncertainty into account. A
scale factor f , by which all data points are multiplied, is introduced to the
expression of the χ2:
χ2A =
(f · x1 − k)2
(f · σ1)2 +
(f · x2 − k)2
(f · σ2)2 +
(f − 1)2
σ2f
. (260)
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Let us also consider the same expression when the individual standard devi-
ations are not rescaled:
χ2B =
(f · x1 − k)2
σ21
+
(f · x2 − k)2
σ22
+
(f − 1)2
σ2f
. (261)
The use of χ2A always gives the result k̂ = x, because the term (f − 1)2/σ2f is
harmless21 as far as the value of the minimum χ2 and the determination on
k̂ are concerned. Its only influence is on σ(k̂), which turns out to be equal
to quadratic combination of the weighted average standard deviation with
σf ·x, the normalization uncertainty on the average. This result corresponds
to the usual one when the normalization factor in the definition of χ2 is not
included, and the overall uncertainty is added at the end.
Instead, the use of χ2B is equivalent to the covariance matrix: the same
values of the minimum χ2, of k̂ and of σ(k̂) are obtained, and f̂ at the min-
imum turns out to be exactly the r ratio defined above. This demonstrates
that the effect happens when the data values are rescaled independently of
their standard uncertainties. The effect can become huge if the data show
mutual disagreement. The equality of the results obtained with χ2B with
those obtained with the covariance matrix allows us to study, in a simpler
way, the behaviour of r (= f̂) when an arbitrary amount of data points are
analysed. The fitted value of the normalization factor is
f̂ =
1
1 +
∑n
i=1
(xi−x)2
σ2i
· σ2f
. (263)
If the values of xi are consistent with a common true value it can be shown
that the expected value of f is
< f >=
1
1 + (n− 1) · σ2f
. (264)
Hence, there is a bias on the result when for a non-vanishing σf a large
number of data points are fitted. In particular, the fit on average produces a
bias larger than the normalization uncertainty itself if σf > 1/(n− 1). One
can also see that σ2(k̂) and the minimum of χ2 obtained with the covariance
matrix or with χ2B are smaller by the same factor r than those obtained with
χ2A.
21This can be seen rewriting (260) as
(x1 − k/f)2
σ21
+
(x2 − k/f)2
σ22
+
(f − 1)2
σ2f
. (262)
For any f , the first two terms determine the value of k, and the third one binds f to 1.
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16.2.4 Peelle’s Pertinent Puzzle
To summarize, where there is an overall uncertainty due to an unknown sys-
tematic error and the covariance matrix is used to define χ2, the behaviour
of the fit depends on whether the uncertainty is on the offset or on the scale.
In the first case the best estimates of the function parameters are exactly
those obtained without overall uncertainty, and only the parameters’ stan-
dard deviations are affected. In the case of unknown normalization errors,
biased results can be obtained. The size of the bias depends on the fitted
function, on the magnitude of the overall uncertainty and on the number of
data points.
It has also been shown that this bias comes from the linearization per-
formed in the usual covariance propagation. This means that, even though
the use of the covariance matrix can be very useful in analyzing the data in
a compact way using available computer algorithms, care is required if there
is one large normalization uncertainty which affects all the data.
The effect discussed above has also been observed independently by R.W.
Peelle and reported the year after the analysis of the CELLO data[17]. The
problem has been extensively discussed among the community of nuclear
physicists, where it is presently known as “Peelle’s Pertinent Puzzle”[18].
A recent case in High Energy Physics in which this effect has been found
to have biased the result is discussed in [19].
17 Multi-effect multi-cause inference: unfold-
ing
17.1 Problem and typical solutions
In any experiment the distribution of the measured observables differs from
that of the corresponding true physical quantities due to physics and detector
effects. For example, one may be interested in measuring in the variables x
and Q2 Deep Inelastic Scattering events. In such a case one is able to build
statistical estimators which in principle have a physical meaning similar to
the true quantities, but which have a non-vanishing variance and are also
distorted due to QED and QCD radiative corrections, parton fragmentation,
particle decay and limited detector performances. The aim of the experimen-
talist is to unfold the observed distribution from all these distortions so as
to extract the true distribution (see also [20] and [21]). This requires a satis-
factory knowledge of the overall effect of the distortions on the true physical
quantity.
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When dealing with only one physical variable the usual method for han-
dling this problem is the so called bin-to-bin correction: one evaluates a
generalized efficiency (it may even be larger than unity) calculating the ratio
between the number of events falling in a certain bin of the reconstructed
variable and the number of events in the same bin of the true variable with a
Monte Carlo simulation. This efficiency is then used to estimate the number
of true events from the number of events observed in that bin. Clearly this
method requires the same subdivision in bins of the true and the experimen-
tal variable and hence it cannot take into account large migrations of events
from one bin to the others. Moreover it neglects the unavoidable correlations
between adjacent bins. This approximation is valid only if the amount of mi-
gration is negligible and if the standard deviation of the smearing is smaller
than the bin size.
An attempt to solve the problem of migrations is sometimes made build-
ing a matrix which connects the number of events generated in one bin to
the number of events observed in the other bins. This matrix is then in-
verted and applied to the measured distribution. This immediately produces
inversion problems if the matrix is singular. On the other hand, there is
no reason from a probabilistic point of view why the inverse matrix should
exist. This as can easily be seen taking the example of two bins of the true
quantity both of which have the same probability of being observed in each
of the bins of the measured quantity. It follows that treating probability dis-
tributions as vectors in space is not correct, even in principle. Moreover the
method is not able to handle large statistical fluctuations even if the matrix
can be inverted (if we have, for example, a very large number of events with
which to estimate its elements and we choose the binning in such a way as
to make the matrix not singular). The easiest way to see this is to think of
the unavoidable negative terms of the inverse of the matrix which in some
extreme cases may yield negative numbers of unfolded events. Quite apart
from these theoretical reservations, the actual experience of those who have
used this method is rather discouraging, the results being highly unstable.
17.2 Bayes’ theorem stated in terms of causes and ef-
fects
Let us state Bayes’ theorem in terms of several independent causes (Ci, i =
1, 2, . . . , nC) which can produce one effect (E). For example, if we consider
Deep Inelastic Scattering events, the effect E can be the observation of an
event in a cell of the measured quantities {∆Q2meas,∆xmeas}. The causes
Ci are then all the possible cells of the true values {∆Q2true,∆xtrue}i. Let us
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assume we know the initial probability of the causes P (Ci) and the conditional
probability that the i-th cause will produce the effect P (E|Ci). The Bayes
formula is then
P (Ci|E) = P (E|Ci) · P (Ci)∑nC
l=1 P (E|Cl) · P (Cl)
. (265)
P (Ci|E) depends on the initial probability of the causes. If one has no better
prejudice concerning P (Ci) the process of inference can be started from a
uniform distribution.
The final distribution depends also on P (E|Ci). These probabilities must
be calculated or estimated with Monte Carlo methods. One has to keep in
mind that, in contrast to P (Ci), these probabilities are not updated by the
observations. So if there are ambiguities concerning the choice of P (E|Ci)
one has to try them all in order to evaluate their systematic effects on the
results.
17.3 Unfolding an experimental distribution
If one observes n(E) events with effect E, the expected number of events
assignable to each of the causes is
n̂(Ci) = n(E) · P (Ci|E) . (266)
As the outcome of a measurement one has several possible effects Ej (j =
1, 2, . . . , nE) for a given cause Ci. For each of them the Bayes formula (265)
holds, and P (Ci|Ej) can be evaluated. Let us write (265) again in the case
of nE possible effects
22, indicating the initial probability of the causes with
P◦(Ci):
P (Ci|Ej) = P (Ej|Ci) · P◦(Ci)∑nC
l=1 P (Ej|Cl) · P◦(Cl)
. (267)
One should note that:
• ∑nCi=1 P◦(Ci) = 1, as usual. Notice that if the probability of a cause is
initially set to zero it can never change, i.e. if a cause does not exist it
cannot be invented;
22The broadening of the distribution due to the smearing suggests a choice of nE larger
then nC . It is worth remarking that there is no need to reject events where a measured
quantity has a value outside the range allowed for the physical quantity. For example,
in the case of Deep Inelastic Scattering events, cells with xmeas > 1 or Q
2
meas < 0 give
information about the true distribution too.
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• ∑nCi=1 P (Ci|Ej) = 1 : this normalization condition, mathematically
trivial since it comes directly from (267), indicates that each effect
must come from one or more of the causes under examination. This
means that if the observables also contain a non negligible amount of
background, this needs to be included among the causes;
• 0 ≤ ǫi ≡
∑nE
j=1 P (Ej|Ci) ≤ 1 : there is no need for each cause to
produce at least one of the effects. ǫi gives the efficiency of finding the
cause Ci in any of the possible effects.
After Nobs experimental observations one obtains a distribution of fre-
quencies n(E) ≡ {n(E1), n(E2), . . . , n(EnE)}. The expected number of events
to be assigned to each of the causes (taking into account only to the observed
events) can be calculated applying (266) to each effect:
n̂(Ci)|obs =
nE∑
j=1
n(Ej) · P (Ci|Ej) . (268)
When inefficiency23 is also brought into the picture, the best estimate of the
true number of events becomes
n̂(Ci) =
1
ǫi
nE∑
j=1
n(Ej) · P (Ci|Ej) ǫi 6= 0 . (269)
From these unfolded events we can estimate the true total number of events,
the final probabilities of the causes and the overall efficiency:
N̂true =
nC∑
i=1
n̂(Ci)
P̂ (Ci) ≡ P (Ci|n(E)) = n̂(Ci)
N̂true
ǫ̂ =
Nobs
N̂true
.
If the initial distribution P◦(C) is not consistent with the data, it will not
agree with the final distribution P̂ (C). The closer the initial distribution is
to the true distribution, the better the agreement is. For simulated data one
can easily verify for simulated data that the distribution P̂ (C) lies between
P◦(C) and the true one. This suggests proceeding iteratively. Fig. 13 shows
an example of a bidimensional distribution unfolding.
More details about iteration strategy, evaluation of uncertainty, etc. can
be found in [23]. I would just like to comment on an obvious criticism that
23If ǫi = 0 then n̂(Ci) will be set to zero, since the experiment is not sensitive to the
cause Ci.
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Figure 13: Example of a two dimensional unfolding: true distribution (a), smeared
distribution (b) and results after the first 4 steps ((c) to (f)).
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may be made: “the iterative procedure is against the Bayesian spirit, since
the same data are used many times for the same inference”. In principle the
objection is valid, but in practice this technique is a “trick” to give to the
experimental data a weight (an importance) larger than that of the priors. A
more rigorous procedure which took into account uncertainties and correla-
tions of the initial distribution would have been much more complicated. An
attempt of this kind can be found in [22]. Examples of unfolding procedures
performed with non-Bayesian methods are described in [20] and [21].
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18 Conclusions
These notes have shown how it is possible to build a powerful theory of mea-
surement uncertainty starting from a definition of probability which seems of
little use at first sight, and from a formula that - some say - looks too trivial
to be called a theorem.
The main advantages the Bayesian approach has over the others are (fur-
ther to the non negligible fact that it is able to treat problems on which the
others fail):
• the recovery of the intuitive idea of probability as a valid concept for
treating scientific problems;
• the simplicity and naturalness of the basic tool;
• the capability of combining prior prejudices and experimental facts;
• the automatic updating property as soon as new facts are observed;
• the transparency of the method which allows the different assumptions
on which the inference may depend to be checked and changed;
• the high degree of awareness that it gives to its user.
When employed on the problem of measurement errors, as a special ap-
plication of conditional probabilities, it allows all possible sources of uncer-
tainties to be treated in the most general way.
When the problems get complicated and the general method becomes
too heavy to handle, it is possible to use approximate methods based on the
linearization of the final probability density function to calculate the first
and second moments of the distribution. Although the formulae are exactly
those of the standard “error propagation”, the interpretation of the true
value as a random variable simplifies the picture and allows easy inclusion of
uncertainties due to systematic effects.
Nevertheless there are some cases in which the linearization may cause
severe problems, as shown in Section 14. In such cases one needs to go back
to the general method or to apply other kinds of approximations which are
not just blind use of the covariance matrix.
The problem of unfolding dealt with in the last section should to be con-
sidered a side remark with respect to the mainstream of the notes. It is in
fact a mixture of genuine Bayesian method (the basic formula), approxima-
tions (covariance matrix evaluation) and ad hoc prescriptions of iteration and
smoothing, used to sidestep the formidable problem of seeking the general
solution.
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I would like to conclude with three quotations:
• “(. . . ) the best evaluation of the uncertainty (. . . ) must be given
(. . . )
The method stands, therefore, in contrast to certain older meth-
ods that have the following two ideas in common:
– The first idea is that the uncertainty reported should be ’safe’
or ’conservative’ (. . . ) In fact, because the evaluation of the
uncertainty of a measurement result is problematic, it was
often made deliberately large.
– The second idea is that the influences that give rise to un-
certainty were always recognizable as either ’random’ or ’sys-
tematic’ with the two being of different nature; (. . . )”
(ISO Guide[2])
• “Well, QED is very nice and impressive, but when everything is
so neatly wrapped up in blue bows, with all experiments in exact
agreement with each other and with the theory - that is when one
is learning absolutely nothing.”
“On the other hand, when experiments are in hopeless conflict -
or when the observations do not make sense according to conven-
tional ideas, or when none of the new models seems to work, in
short when the situation is an unholy mess - that is when one is
really making hidden progress and a breakthrough is just around
the corner!”
(R. Feynman, 1973 Hawaii Summer Institute, cited by D.
Perkins at 1995 EPS Conference, Brussels)
• “Although this Guide provides a framework for assessing uncer-
tainty, it cannot substitute for critical thinking, intellectual hon-
esty, and professional skill. The evaluation of uncertainty is nei-
ther a routine task nor a purely mathematical one; it depends
on detailed knowledge of the nature of the measurand and of the
measurement. The quality and utility of the uncertainty quoted
for the result of a measurement therefore ultimately depend on
the understanding, critical analysis, and integrity of those who
contribute to the assignment of its value”. (ISO Guide[2])
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Bibliographic note
The state of the art of Bayesian theory is summarized in [7], where many
references can be found. A concise presentation of the basic principles can
instead been found in [24]. Text books that I have consulted are [4] and
[6]. They contain many references too. As an introduction to subjective
probability de Finetti’s “Theory of probability”[5] is a must. I have found
the reading of [25] particular stimulating and that of [26] very convincing
(thanks expecially to the many examples and exercises). Unfortunately these
two books are only available in Italian for the moment.
Sections 6 and 7 can be reviewed in standard text books. I recommend
those familiar to you.
The applied part of these notes, i.e. after section 9, is, in a sense, “orig-
inal”, as it has been derived autonomously and, in many cases, without the
knowledge that the results have been known to experts for two centuries.
Some of the examples of section 13 were worked out for these lectures. The
references in the applied part are given at the appropriate place in the text
- only those actually used have been indicated. Of particular interest is the
Weise and Wo¨ger theory of uncertainty[14], which differs from that of these
notes because of the additional use of the Maximum Entropy Principle.
A consultation of the ISO Guide[2] is advised. Presently the BIPM recom-
mendations are also followed by the american National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), whose Guidelines[27] have the advantage, with re-
spect to the ISO Guide, of being available on www too.
97
References
[1] DIN Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normung, “Grunbegriffe der Messtechnick -
Behandlung von Unsicherheiten bei der Auswertung von Messungen” (DIN
1319 Teile 1-4), Beuth Verlag GmbH, Berlin, Germany, 1985. Only parts
1-3 are published in English. An English translation of part 4 can be re-
quested from the authors of [14]. Part 3 is going to be rewritten in order
to be made in agreement with [2] (private communication from K. Weise).
[2] International Organization for Standardization (ISO), “Guide to the ex-
pression of uncertainty in measurement”, Geneva, Switzerland, 1993.
[3] H. Jeffreys, “Theory of probability”, Oxford University Press, 1961.
[4] R. L. Winkler, “An introduction to Bayesian inference and decision”, Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972.
[5] B. de Finetti, “Theory of probability”, J. Wiley & Sons, 1974.
[6] S. J. Press, “Bayesian statistics: principles, models, and applications”,
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1989.
[7] J.M. Bernardo, A.F.M. Smith, “Bayesian theory”, John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
Chichester, 1994.
[8] Particle Data Group, “Review of particle properties”, Phys. Rev. D, 50
(1994) 1173.
[9] New Scientist, April 28 1995, pag. 18 (“Gravitational constant is up in the
air”). The data of Tab. 2 are from H. Meyer’s DESY seminar, June 28
1995.
[10] P.L. Gaison, “How experiments end”, The University of Chicago Press,
1987.
[11] G. D’Agostini, “Limits on electron compositeness from the Bhabha scat-
tering at PEP and PETRA”, Proceedings of the XXV th Rencontre de
Moriond on “Z◦ Physics”, Les Arcs (France), March 4-11, 1990, pag. 229
(also DESY-90-093).
[12] A.K. Wro´blewski, ”Arbitrariness in the development of physics”, after-
dinner talk at the International Workshop on Deep Inelastic Scattering
and Related Subjects, Eilat, Israel, 6-11 February 1994, Ed. A. Levy (World
Scientific, 1994), pag. 478.
[13] E.T. Jaynes, “Information theory and statistical mechanics”, Phys. Rev.
106 (1957) 620.
98
[14] K. Weise, W. Wo¨ger, “A Bayesian theory of measurement uncertainty”,
Meas. Sci. Technol., 4 (1993) 1.
[15] International Organization for Standardization (ISO), “International vo-
cabulary of basic and general terms in metrology”, Geneva, Switzerland,
1993.
[16] G. D’Agostini, “On the use of the covariance matrix to fit correlated data”,
Nucl. Instr. Meth. A346 (1994) 306.
[17] CELLO Collaboration, H.J. Behrend et al., “Determination of αs and
sin2 θw from measurements of total hadronic cross section in e
+e− annihi-
lation”, Phys. Lett. 183B (1987) 400.
[18] S. Chiba and D.L. Smith, ”Impacts of data transformations on least-square
solutions and their significance in data analysis and evaluation”, J. Nucl.
Sc. Tech. 31 (1994) 770.
[19] M. L. Swartz, “Reevaluation of the hadronic contribution to α(M2Z)”,
SLAC-PUB-95-7001, September 1995, submitted to Phys. Rev. D.
[20] V. Blobel, Proceedings of the “1984 CERN School of Computing”,
Aiguablava, Catalonia, Spain, 9-12 September 1984, Published by CERN,
July 1985, pag. 88-127.
[21] G. Zech, “Comparing statistical data to Monte Carlo simulation - param-
eter fitting and unfolding”, DESY 95-113, June 1995.
[22] K. Weise, “Matematical foundation of an analytical approach to bayesian
Monte Carlo spectrum unfolding”, Physicalish Technische Bundesanstalt,
Braunschweig, BTB-N-24, July 1995.
[23] G. D’Agostini, “A multidimensional unfolding method based on Bayes’ the-
orem”, Nucl. Instr. Meth. A362 (1995) 487.
[24] C. Howson and P. Urbach, “Bayesian reasoning in science”, Nature, Vol.
350, 4 April 1991, pag. 371.
[25] B. de Finetti, “Filosofia della probabilita`”, il Saggiatore, 1995.
[26] R. Scozzafava, “La probabilita` soggettiva e le sue applicazioni”, Masson,
editoriale Veschi, Roma, 1993.
[27] B.N. Taylor and C.E. Kuyatt, “Guidelines for evaluating and expressing
uncertainty of NIST measurement results”, NIST Technical Note 1297,
September 1994;
(www: http://physics.nist.gov/Pubs/guidelines/outline.html).
99
